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I. INTRODUCTION 
America is a world power, but does it have the strength to 
understand itself? Is it content, even now, to remain an intel-
lectual colony, borrowing European categories to decode the 
meaning of its national identity? . . . When America was a 
military and economic weakling on the European fringe, it 
was at the forefront of constitutional thought; as it trans-
formed itself into the powerhouse of the West, its leading 
constitutionalists became increasingly derivative. 1 
My message is different. I reject Westminster as well as 
Washington as my guide and proffer the model of constrained 
parliamentarianism as the most promising framework for fu-
ture development of the separation of powers. . . . [T]he suc-
cess of the German Constitution has inspired other countries, 
most notably Spain, to use it as a reference point in their own 
transitions from authoritarianism. Constrained parliamen-
tarianism, then, is a rising force in the world, and there is 
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I. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 3 (Harvard U. Press, 1991). 
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much to be learned from its practical operation over the past 
half-century.2 
Yale Law Professor Bruce Ackerman is a self-proclaimed 
fan of the United States' unique contribution to global constitu-
tional thought. The very same Bruce Ackerman is also now the 
most outspoken proponent of the superiority of German style 
parliamentary government to our American system of the presi-
dential separation of powers.3 How can this be? How could the 
most able American constitutional law professor of his genera-
tion turn his back on the central design feature of the U.S. Con-
stitution? Are we Americans to become again an "intellectual 
colony" this time ruled by Berlin instead of London? Must we 
hang our heads in shame when we travel overseas, apologizing to 
all concerned for our untrendy system of separation of powers 
governance? 
No, a thousand times no! The existence of presidentialism 
and of the separation of powers in our Constitution is a praise-
worthy feature of the document that should be emulated abroad. 
We should be proud of the fact that "in the 1980s and 1990s, all 
the new aspirant democracies in Latin America and Asia (Korea 
and the Philippines) have chosen pure presidentialism [and that 
of] the approximately twenty-five countries that now constitute 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, only three-
Hungary, the new Czech Republic, and Slovakia-have chosen 
pure parliamentarianism. "4 American style presidentialism and 
2. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 640 
(2000). 
3. In The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, Professor Ackerman 
urges newly emerging democracies to copy the German constrained parliamentary gov-
ernment model in place of the U.S. system of presidentialism and the separation of pow-
ers. (Professor Ackerman also argues in his Article for a number of interesting innova-
tions in the separation of powers, such as the creation of separate branches to promote 
democracy, integrity, regulation, and distributive justice, all of which concern subjects 
beyond the scope of my reply). 
In arguing that newly emerging democracies would do better to copy the German 
over the U.S. Constitution, Professor Ackerman relies on the superb work of his Yale 
colleague, Juan J. Linz, who is Sterling Professor of Political and Social Science. Juan J. 
Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., 1 & 2 The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Johns 
Hopkins U. Press, 1994). Professor Linz's seminal work is mentioned throughout Profes-
sor Ackerman's recent Article, and thus this reply must be in part a response to Professor 
Linz as well as Professor Ackerman. 
I should note that I was privileged to be a student of Professor Linz's during my un-
dergraduate years in Yale College. I regret that I must disagree with him in this Article, 
but I take solace from the fact that my disagreements are prompted by concerns that he 
first brought to my attention almost 25 years ago in his course on the crisis and break-
down of democratic regimes. 
4. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, Presidentialism and Parliamentarianism in 
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separation of powers is today, as Woodrow Wilson might rue-
fully say, "the world's fashion. "5 
Ever since France switched to a form of presidential gov-
ernment in 19586 more and more new democracies have chosen 
presidentialism. In recent times, several parliamentary democ-
racies including France and Israel have moved to presidentialist 
direct election of the Chief Executive, but no originally presiden-
tialist regime has made the switch in the other direction. Bruce 
Ackerman is absolutely right to say that presidentialism is now 
the toast of the world. 7 It has joined such other American public 
law exports as written constitutions, judicial review, and federal-
ism, all of which are among the United States of America's chief 
contributions to world thought. The U.S. may run a balance of 
trade deficit in many areas, but when it comes to the war of ideas 
we are running a big surplus as exporters of public law.8 Former 
enemies like Russia, Germany, and Japan are all now governed 
under Constitutions that owe much to American thinking. So 
why is Professor Ackerman so sad? Why is this leading voice of 
American constitutionalism not joyful over our triumph in the 
war of ideas? 
Comparative Perspective, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 119, 120 (cited in 
note 3). 
5. Woodrow Wilson was a leading admirer of parliamentary government who 
urged its adoption in the United States and who described it in the 1880's as then being 
"the world's fashion." See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms 
and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries 10 (Yale U. Press, 1999) (quoting Wilson). 
6. The French form of presidential government may technically involve an alterna-
tion between presidential and parliamentary phases. Arend Lijphart argues that "the 
Fifth Republic is, instead of semipresidential, usually presidential and only occasionally 
parliamentary." Arend Lijphart, Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoreti-
cal Observations, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 91, 95 (cited in note 3). He 
believes, following Maurice Duverger, that the Fifth Republic has the dynamic of a 
presidential system when one party controls both the presidency and a majority in par-
liament and the dynamic of a parliamentary system when there is divided party control or 
"cohabitation" as the French call it. 
7. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 636 (cited in note 2). As this article went to 
press, Israel had just ended its experimentation with direct election of the prime minister 
but pro-reform forces in Japan were powerfully advocating a move to direct election of 
the prime minister. 
8. In fairness, it should be noted that the U.S. legal system lags behind other 
Western countries in some important respects, especially because of its overly brutal sys-
tem of criminal law enforcement, which relies excessively on the death penalty and on 
the highest rates of incarceration per capita of any advanced Western nation. Ironically, 
our rates of criminal incarceration would be lower today if our Supreme Court had ad-
hered more stringently to the separation of powers when it wrongly upheld the constitu-
tionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Sec Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The answer is that to some extent Ackerman is joyful.9 In 
fact, he thinks the U.S. succeeded so well in assisting with the 
design of the German Constitution that we actually helped pro-
duce something better than the document that still governs us. 
Bruce Ackerman is not merely another in the long line of 
American progressives who, from Woodrow Wilson's time on, 
have preferred British-style parliamentary government to our 
home-spun American separation of powers. No, Ackerman likes 
the German system of parliamentary government precisely be-
cause it has some separation of powers but not as much as the 
U.S. has. Germany has a powerful constitutional court, which 
exercises judicial review-and states with real power-but it 
fuses the executive and legislature together into one entity, and 
Ackerman thinks this end result is better than either the U.S. or 
the British Westminster model. 10 Ackerman calls the German 
system constrained parliamentary government, and he prefers it 
to the British model because it does not give one party total 
power for winning just one election. 11 He prefers it to the 
American model because it produces less gridlock, fewer pa-
thologies, and a more ideological system of governance. 12 
I think Professor Ackerman's preference for German style 
constrained parliamentary government is misplaced. While I 
prefer parliamentary government with judicial review and feder-
alism to the monism of the British Westminister form, I much 
prefer the American separation of powers model to both the 
Berlin and London alternatives. And, I think it is high time that 
we Americans appreciated our homegrown system of the separa-
tion of powers and sang its praises more loudly. That is what I 
propose to do in this Article. I want unabashedly to discuss ten 
reasons why our form of constitutional design is a good form 
worthy of the emulation it has been receiving from other, newly-
emerging democracies. 
In doing this I shall conflate the term "presidentialism" with 
the term "separation of powers" because all presidential re-
gimes, as the term is generally understood, have a separately 
9. In all seriousness, I should note that Ackerman is exceptionally open-minded to 
consider the possibility that a Constitution other than the one he was born under might 
be the best in the world. Too few individuals possess this degree of open-mindedness, 
and I admire Ackerman for his cosmopolitan outlook even though I disagree with his 
conclusions. 
10. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 639 (cited in note 2). 
II. Id. at 639-40. 
12. Id. at 643-64. 
2001] VIRTUES OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 55 
elected executive and legislature, hence the phrase the separa-
tion of powers. I shall distinguish presidential regimes here from 
parliamentary regimes with the operative definition being that in 
a parliamentary regime the head of government (who I shall 
generically refer to as the Prime Minister) 13 is responsible to the 
legislature in the sense that he is dependent on the legislature's 
confidence and can be dismissed from office by a legislative vote 
of no confidence. In contrast, in a presidential system the presi-
dent and the legislature are elected separately and the President 
holds his office for a fixed term of years. 14 
So why, then, is presidentialism and the separation of pow-
ers a good thing when compared with a constrained parliamen-
tary regime subject to judicial review and with constitutional 
federalism guarantees to boot? Why are we Americans right to 
think that the libertarian, capitalist world order that we have 
helped to form over the last fifty years is well served by a re-
gime-type designed 200 years ago in a very different world? I 
will proceed in answering those questions herein by contrasting 
my views with the differing views of Professor Ackerman and of 
his Yale colleague Juan Linz, on whom Ackerman significantly 
relies. Both Professors Ackerman and Linz can now be counted 
as being among the chief exponents of the virtues of German-
style constrained parliamentary government for newly emerging 
democratic regimes. Professors Ackerman and Linz are among 
the ablest champions parliamentarianism has ever had, so I feel 
confident that in replying to their arguments, I am giving my in-
tellectual opponents all that is their due. 
13. In reality, many parliamentary regimes use other titles such as Premier, Chan-
cellor, Minister-President, and Taoiseach (in Ireland). Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy 
at 117 (cited in note 5). 
14. These two definitional criteria are used by Arend Lijphart and seem to me to 
capture the essential difference between the two regime types. Lijphart, Patterns of De-
mocracy at 117-18 (cited in note 5). While there is much discussion in the political sci-
ence literature about classificatory criteria, I am content with the two bare bones criteria 
listed simply because they most help us capture the essential differences between parlia-
mentary and presidential forms. That being said, there are other differences of interest, 
particularly the fact as Lijphart notes in his third criteria of differentiation that parlia-
mentary systems usually have a collegial executive while presidential systems typically 
have a hierarchical or unitary executive. !d. at 118. This difference is important as will 
be discussed later. 
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II. PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT IS SUPERIOR TO 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
The case for presidential government over parliamentary 
government includes both arguments for the former and against 
the latter. I want to begin with a discussion of the case for presi-
dential government and then explain why I think Bruce Acker-
man and Juan Linz are wrong to fear that U.S. style presidential-
ism will break down into dictatorship if it is exported to newly 
emerging democratic regimes. 
A. TEN ARGUMENTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 
The case for presidential government is usefully summa-
rized into ten arguments supporting that type of regime. Cumu-
latively, these ten concerns suggest that presidentialism is: more 
democratic, more stable, less ideological, more protective of ju-
dicial review, and more libertarian than will be parliamentary 
regimes, all else being equal. These ten arguments by no means 
suggest that currently existing parliamentary regimes should 
abandon their Constitutions and immediately switch to presiden-
tialism. But, they do suggest reasons for preferring presidential-
ism when drafting new Constitutions and for considering a 
change over to presidentialism when a countries' parliamentary 
institutions are not functioning well. Presidentialism thus is to 
be preferred only when all else remains equal, which of course is 
rarely the case in the real world. 
1. Sampling the Popular Will 
A first argument favoring the American system of separa-
tion of powers over the German system of constrained parlia-
mentary government is quite simply that the American system is 
more democratic and more sophisticated in its mechanism for 
sampling the Popular Will. In Ackerman's terms, the American 
system best answers the question: "How many elections should a 
political movement win before gaining how much lawmaking au-
thority?" 15 
In a German-style constrained parliamentary regime, one 
national victory will give a party or a coalition of parties great 
power to nationalize or privatize, regulate or deregulate huge 
sectors of the economy. Only the constitutional court, and state 
15. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 643 (cited in note 2). 
2001] VIRTUES OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 57 
governments if any exist, could potentially stand in the way of a 
newly elected government with 51% of the vote in a constrained 
parliamentary regime. And, even the Constitutional Court could 
offer less of a check than would the Supreme Court in this coun-
try. Basically, German-style constrained parliamentary govern-
ment gives a whole lot of power to a party for winning just one 
election by the narrowest margin, and, it is not even an election 
in which you get to vote differently as a citizen of the nation and 
as a member of a legislative district. One choice on one balloe 6 
and that is it for the next four or five years. 
This result reflects an inadequate sampling of public opin-
ion. A countries' electoral regime ought to be able to distinguish 
between narrow and landslide majorities for particular positions 
and between positions that are held widely across the whole of a 
geographically diverse country and those that are held with great 
intensity only in some sections or regions. Similarly, a country's 
electoral regime ought to be able to distinguish the intensity with 
which particular positions are held. The electoral regime of the 
typical German-style constrained parliamentary government 
cannot make any of these finer distinctions. It offers great 
power to the narrow sectional majoritarian victor and to the 
landslide victor alike. 
In contrast, the familiar dualistic American system-so fa-
mously described by Professor Ackerman himself in We The 
People17 -looks much more constrained. A political movement 
has to win a whole lot of elections in very differently described 
constituencies for a much longer period of time before it can 
wield total lawmaking power. Our Madisonian system of stag-
gered elections every two years for the House of Representa-
tives, every four years for the presidency, and every six years for 
one third of the Senate is a much more sophisticated way of 
sampling the popular will than that offered by the German sys-
tem. It gauges and recalibrates not only the geographical spread 
of particular viewpoints but also the intensity with which opin-
ions are held. A political movement cannot sweep just one re-
gion of our geographically diverse country and prevail under our 
system. Nor will a political movement prevail if the issues giving 
rise to it lose their fire after two or even four years. The Madi-
sonian electoral system provides for a kind of rolling and con-
tinuous sampling of public opinion over a full six year election 
16. Id. at 643. 
17. Ackerman, We the People (cited in note 1). 
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cycle with ten years or more of dominance required before a po-
litical movement can hope to ap~oint five or six of the nine jus-
tices on the U.S. Supreme Court. 8 
Moreover, the elections held in the U.S. system are qualita-
tively different in two vital ways from those held under a Ger-
man constrained parliamentary system. First, they are held at 
arbitrary times and not at the beck and call of the current in-
house elite, which in a parliamentary system can try to time elec-
tions to ensure a favorable result. 19 And second, U.S. elections 
are held in three carefully and differently defined geographical 
units: the congressional district which elects a Representative; 
the State, which elects a Senator in two cycles out of every three; 
and the nation which elects the president and vice president 
through the federalizing filter of the Electoral College. By con-
tinuously sampling these three very different geographical units 
over a rolling six year cycle, the American system is bound to 
track public opinion more closely than will a constrained parlia-
mentary system in which fewer samples are taken in only one 
unit with only one choice offered to the voters. Americans have 
the luxury of splitting their tickets so that they can, for example, 
elect a conservative President who is hawkish on foreign policy 
issues and tough on crime while electing liberal Congresses to 
build up the social safety net. Germans have no such luxury, 
having only one ballot to cast with one choice where we typically 
have three. If they want a conservative foreign policy they have 
to accept a conservative domestic policy in the legislature be-
cause the system has bundled the issues together and gives them 
only one vote for Chancellor and for Representative. This bun-
dling together means fewer choices for German voters than we 
Americans typically enjoy and therefore less democracy. 
The American system is bound to do a better job of sam-
pling the popular will for exactly the same reason a sophisticated 
daily tracking poll will be superior to a weekly or monthly poll 
that can miss a sudden sea change in public sentiments. Both the 
American system and a tracking poll take more samples of pub-
lic opinion in more units and in both cases better information 
leads to a more accurate result. If one truly wants democratic 
governance, more elections in more units clearly offers more 
\8. "All in all, the American system sometimes requires a political movement to 
keep on winning elections for ten years or more before it can assume full control over all 
key institutions .... " Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 650 (cited in note 2). 
\9. Id.at644. 
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democracy. Obviously, there are other important principles at 
stake besides and, accordingly, I would not agree with those co-
lonial Americans who thought that "where annual elections end, 
tyranny begins."20 But I also would not give up on our practice 
of having mid-term elections every two years to check the party 
that last won the presidency, as we often do. A two year blank 
check proved to be quite enough to voters in 1994 when they 
took away some of the power they had given Bill Clinton in 
1992. And, the same thing happened again in 1982 when the 
voters took away some of the power they had given Ronald 
Reagan in 1980. A German style constrained parliamentary sys-
tem would offer no mid-term opportunity to rein in the hubris 
and over-reaching of recent political winners and recent history 
in the United States suggests that could prove to be a costly loss 
of democratic power in many, many instances. The first advan-
tage of the American system of separation of powers is that it 
more accurately samples the popular will. 
2. Guaranteeing Stability 
A second argument favoring the American separation of 
powers regime over a German constrained parliamentary regime 
is that the American system offers more stability than the Ger-
man system.21 Just as it is vital for a democracy to take many ac-
curate soundings of public opinion, so too is it vital that the win-
ners be empowered to act once the elections have been held. 
Powerful individual and corporate economic actors need politi-
cal stability if they are to be able to make the long-range invest-
ment decisions that modern capitalism absolutely requires. 
Sadly, parliamentary government has all too often degenerated 
into a spectacle of instability as happened in France under the 
Third and Fourth Republics with its weak regimes d'assemblee 
governments or more recently in Italy, which has had more then 
50 governments since World War II, or in Israel or Japan. All of 
these regimes degenerated into or experienced weak revolving-
20. Federalist 53 (Madison) in Isaac Framnick, ed., The Federalist Papers 326, 326 
(Penguin Books, 1987). 
21. Juan Linz implicitly concedes this point and views it as the single biggest advan-
tage of American style presidential government. Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parlimen-
tary Democracy: Does lc Make a Difference, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 
3, 65 (cited m note 3) ("I have to admit that government instability has been one of the 
strong arguments against parliamentarism and in favor of presidentialism."). See also 
Arend Lijphart, ed., Parliamencary Versus Presidencial Government 11 (Oxford U. Press, 
1992) ("The first advantage of presidential government, executive stability, is based on 
the president's fixed term of office"). 
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door Cabinets that could not persist in office for long enough to 
govern. No sooner would a Cabinet Government be formed 
than one of the coalition parties necessary to its formation would 
drop out. The result typically is constant government crisis with 
the bureaucracy running every thing on autopilot while democ-
ratic politicians squabble. In the best of circumstances, this 
leads, as it has done in modern Italy, to public disenchantment 
and the irrelevance of democratic institutions. In the worst of 
circumstances, in Weimar Germany, revolving door Cabinets 
paved the way for the success of anti-democratic forces led by 
Hitler and the Communist opposition. Indeed, Hitler and the 
Communists at times pooled their forces in the Weimar Repub-
lic to produce chaos-causing votes of no confidence with their in-
famous red-brown anti-democratic coalitions. 
Instability can be fatal to a democracy as it was to the Wei-
mar Republic and to the French Third and Fourth Republics be-
cause people conclude elections are meaningless if the govern-
ments they produce always collapse before the Ministers can do 
anything. Democracy requires that elections generate clear win-
ners and losers who can either govern or head up the loyal oppo-
sition and many parliamentary governments have clearly failed 
even in the present era to achieve that most basic end. It is for 
this reason that Israel recently experimented with direct popular 
election of the prime minister-a major step toward presidential 
government22 - and that Italy is also debating whether to move 
to direct election of the prime minister. Both of these countries 
have tired of the weakness and instability of regime d'assemblee 
governments and, encouraged by the presidentialist example of 
France's Fifth Republic, they have considered moving toward or 
in Israel's case have moved toward presidentialism. 
In Israel, the weakness and instability of the majority coali-
tion governments often gave great power to small fringe parties. 
Because Israel has a very extreme form of proportional repre-
sentation, small and extreme religious parties in the Knesset with 
only one or two seats sometimes ended up holding enormous 
22. Leading political scientist Arend Lijphart classifies Israel as having been a 
presidential democracy since that country's adoption in 1996 of direct election of the 
Prime Minister. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy at 123-24 (cited in note 5). As this arti-
cle went to press, Israel had just ended its experimentation with direct election because 
that system turned out to be incompatible with the proportional representation used to 
select members of the Israeli Knesset. In other countries like Japan, however, the newly 
empowered reform Prime Minister is advocating a move to direct election of the prime 
minister. 
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power to make or break a coalition government. Many observ-
ers concluded that the Israeli electoral system gave these fringe 
parties way too much power, which they could use to extract pol-
icy concessions that a clear majority of the Israeli people re-
jected. A good electoral system should result in the generation 
of a government and a loyal opposition that reflect the public's 
major bodies of opinion without turning oddball fringe elements 
into the king-makers of national politics. Parliamentary coali-
tion governments that are dependent on very small parties for 
their continuation in office are always at the mercy of the de-
mands of those small parties, which may demand policy conces-
sions that are resented by large national majorities. 
Presidential government solves the problem of stability by 
guaranteeing that the executive and legislative officers will serve 
for a fixed term of years regardless of subsequent events and re-
gardless of the extreme demands of a few of the government's 
supporters. Even when an election produces an indeterminate 
compromise outcome by, for example, producing divided party 
control of the presidency and the legislature, the compromise re-
sult is a stable one for a fixed term of years. For example, in the 
U.S. today President Bush and his Democratic opponents in the 
Senate and the House are firmly empowered for the next year 
and one-half without regard to any sea change in public opinion 
that could occur. The approval ratings of the President or the 
Congress could plunge tomorrow and the President and Con-
gress would still serve out their terms until January 2003 or 2005. 
Since democracies need stability and since modern capitalism 
rewards political regimes that offer a stable investment climate, 
the fact that presidential government can offer such stability is a 
big plus. It definitely makes presidential government superior to 
a regime d'assemblee type of weak, revolving-door Cabinets of 
the kind that is sometimes generated in parliamentary regimes. 
Professor Ackerman believes the problem of instability in 
parliamentary regimes has been solved by two features of the 
German constrained parliamentary model which have been 
widely emulated. These features are: first, the 5% threshold 
which parties must meet to be represented in parliament; and 
second, the requirement that only constructive votes of no confi-
dence can succeed. 23 
23. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 654-55 (cited in note 2). 
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These provisions DO represent great improvements and 
merit some discussion. The 5% threshold as it works in Ger-
many prevents any party that receives less than 5% of the vote 
from being represented in the legislature under proportional 
representation. The threshold is supposed to eliminate fringe 
parties and extremist groups while still permitting important or 
mainstream third and fourth parties to be proportionally repre-
sented. In Germany, which also has a constitutional ban on 
some anti-regime parties, the 5% threshold does seem to have 
produced for the moment a pretty stable multi-party system with 
no serious anti-regime elements currently represented in the 
German Parliament. The Christian and Social Democrats in 
Germany have had to deal with only a moderate Free Democ-
ratic (classical liberal) Party, with an environmentalist party, the 
Greens, and with the democratic successor to the East German 
Communist Party. To date, the various neo-Nazi parties, un-
democratic Leftist parties, and anti-immigrant groups have gone 
mostly unrepresented. 
The operative phrase here is "to date". It is quite easy to 
imagine any of those more extreme groups meeting the 5% 
threshold in the future, particularly if they pool their resouces. 
Consider the case of Germany's next-door neighbor Austria. In 
Austria, a hateful anti-immigrant bigot Jorg Haider has for years 
been represented in the Austrian parliament under that coun-
tries' system of proportional representation. Initially, the mod-
erate right-of-center party and the Socialists formed a pro-
democratic grand coalition government to keep Haider out of 
office. This grand coalition was necessary because the Socialists, 
even with a substantial plurality of the vote that would have 
given them victory under U.S. electoral rules, could not clear 
51% of the vote in the legislature as needed under proportional 
representation to survive a vote of no confidence. The Social-
ist/Conservative Grand Coalition Government in Austria per-
sisted for many years united in the desire to keep Jorg Haider 
out of power. With every passing election, the Coalition lost 
strength, and Jorg Haider's anti-immigrant forces gained 
strength, in part because Haider was the only opposition anyone 
could vote for, there being no "Loyal" opposition. Eventually 
Haider's party became the second biggest of the three, winning 
well over 20% of the vote in Austria's most recent national elec-
tions and at that point the Conservatives, now in third place, 
dropped out of their coalition government with the Socialists 
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and formed a coalition with Haider, thereby letting a hatefully 
racist group assume national power. 
This development is distressing in and of itself, but it is dou-
bly distressing because it looks eerily like the political develop-
ments that helped to destabilize the Weimar Republic and that 
opened the door to Hitler's rise to power in Weimar, Germany. 
In both cases, proportional representation gave Hitler and 
Haider an initial position in the legislature, which was divided 
between democratic forces in the government and anti-
democratic forces in opposition to the government. In both 
cases, years of attrition and normal wear and tear shrank the size 
of the pro-democratic forces in the government and swelled the 
ranks of the anti-government "disloyal" opposition. Finally, a 
breakthrough occurs whereby Hitler and Haider are suddenly 
deemed not that unacceptable, and they make it into the Cabi-
net. The final stage, which has yet to occur in Austria and which 
I hope will never occur, is for the leader of the anti-regime forces 
to take over as Chancellor or Prime Minister. 
The recent Austrian developments suggest to me that reli-
ance on a 5% threshold to keep anti-democratic extremists out 
of the legislature is insufficient. Racist and other extremist par-
ties in many western countries have easily cleared 5% support in 
many public opinion polls at many times in the last 50 years. 
Jean Marie Le Pen, the racist anti-immigrant leader in France 
has often polled over 10% of the vote in that country and neo-
Nazi's have hovered near 5% of the vote in Germany for many 
years.24 Stalinist parties often cleared the 5% hurdle in France 
and Italy for a time after World War II. Even in the United 
States, George Wallace received well over 5% of the vote in his 
1968 bid for the U.S. presidency. A 5% threshold is simply too 
low to keep virulently racist and anti-democratic parties out of 
the legislature and out of a position where they can play king-
maker in parliamentary coalition politics. 
A 5% threshold is surely better than no such threshold, and 
it has to date worked well in Germany in part because of divi-
sions among neo-Nazi elements. But, it is all too easy for me to 
imagine the Jorg Haider phenomenon succeeding in present day 
Germany, much as it did in Austria. It is vitally important that 
24. The French Fifth Republic reintroduced proportional representation in 1986. 
France currently has a 12% threshold. Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary De-
mocracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 3, 65 
(cited in note 3). 
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the Government face a loyal opposition that is always ready and 
able to take over from it if the economy falters or if there is an 
unexpected foreign policy setback. Proportional representation 
reduces the likelihood of there being a stable government and a 
stable opposition that is loyal and that can govern on its own. If 
the pro-regime parties have to form a grand coalition to prevent 
wacky racist or religious or stalinist parties from making extreme 
demands, then it will only be a matter of time before that coali-
tion disintegrates and some anti-regime elements get welcomed 
into the Cabinet. Better two moderate right- and left-of-center 
coalitions than a Cabinet with openly anti-regime parties repre-
sented. 
Professor Ackerman might respond by suggesting raising 
the threshold from 5% to 10%, or by suggesting abolition of 
proportional representation altogether. I would heartily endorse 
either move for reasons that I discuss further below. But for 
now let it suffice to note that raising the threshold even to 10% 
would not stop Haider or Le Pen. They clear 10% in most opin-
ion polls quite easily. A stable democratic government or a loyal 
opposition cannot by definition be reliant on the votes of racist, 
anti-immigrant, or violence-condoning political parties. It is a 
great weakness of parliamentary democracy that it often em-
powers these anti-regime fringe elements. 
Well, what about the constructive vote of no confidence? 
This is a rule that prevents future red-brown coalitions by pro-
viding that a vote of no confidence can only succeed if it is a vote 
for a new government and not merely a vote against a current 
government. Like the 5% threshold, this too is a good idea 
which I whole-heartedly endorse. The constructive vote of no 
confidence prevents anti-regime parties from ganging up on the 
pro-regime parties when they have no common agenda. It pre-
vents, in other words, the Nazis and the Communists from voting 
out of office a Centrist Government when they themselves share 
no common program. 25 
The problem with the constructive vote of no confidence is 
that it cannot prevent a red-brown coalition in the legislature 
from voting down the government's bills. Such a coalition, if it 
includes a majority of the legislature, can prevent passage of a 
25. As Linz explains, "This constitutional device gives the prime minister in parlia-
mentary systems a strong position; he or she cannot be overthrown by a purely negative 
majority, as happened in the Weimar Republic when Nazis and Communists made stable 
government impossible but were unable to provide an alternative one." Id at 66. 
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budget, of foreign policy bills, indeed of all legislation. The only 
thing such a negative 51% coalition cannot do is elect a Chancel-
lor or Prime Minister. The constructive vote of no confidence, 
like the 5% threshold, is an improvement over the rules of Wei-
mar Germany, but it is no substitute for a stable two party sys-
tem with a moderate left and right both of which can alternate in 
government. Both the constructive vote of no confidence and 
the 5% threshold allow anti-regime parties to play a destabiliz-
ing role in legislative politics, including in the election of the 
government. Stability is important to a democracy, and presi-
dential government is more stable than is parliamentary gov-
ernment because it is less likely to find itself beholden to extrem-
ist elements. 
There is one final argument about presidentialism and sta-
bility which needs to be addressed, and that is Juan Linz's point 
that in the U.S. our presidents may reliably serve for four or 
eight year terms but our Cabinet Secretaries and Assistant Sec-
retaries tend to stay in office for much briefer periods of time.26 
Linz points out that U.S. Cabinet Secretaries actually typically 
serve for less long than do Cabinet Secretaries in the overwhelm-
ing majority of parliamentary regimes.27 Ministerial duration is 
short in America, and Linz rightly asks if this may not counter-
act any gain in stability at the level of the chief executive offi-
cer.28 I do not think it does. 
26. Ackerman notes that the "median tenure of a political appointee has been go-
ing down for some time and is now about two years. One third serve for less than one 
and a half years!" Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 706-07 (cited in note 2) (footnote 
omitted). 
27. Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Differ-
ence?, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 31, 65 (cited in note 3). Linz quotes 
Jean Blonde! as claiming that "(m]inisterial duration is short in America: among Atlantic 
countries only Finland, Portugal and Greece had a shorter duration of ministers than the 
U.S.-which, on the other hand, with ministers lasting an average just over three years, 
scores only a little more than the bulk of the Latin American countries, and is precisely 
at almost the same point as Costa Rica. Constitutional presidentialism does therefore 
lead, even where it has operated effectively and without hindrance, to a low ministerial 
duration .... " Id. at 31; see also, Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, Presidentialism and 
Parliamentarism in Comparative Perspective, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 
119, 127 (cited in note 3) ("the average duration of a minister in any one appointment is 
almost twice as long in parliamentary democracies as it is in presidential democracies"). 
28. Linz observes that "Government instability has been one of the strongest argu-
ments against parliamentarism and in favor of presidentialism. In making that argument, 
it has been forgotten that there is considerable cabinet instability in presidential sys-
tems .... " Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Dif-
ference?, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 3, 65 (cited in note 3). Ackerman 
also argues that the rapid turnover in political appointees in the U.S. is a problem. Ac-
kerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 706-09 (cited in note 2). 
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Cabinet Secretaries in the U.S. administer their depart-
ments in conjunction with a life-tenured civil service bureaucracy 
and with the congressional oversight committees and sub-
committees that are responsible for their departments. The con-
gressional committees and subcommittees are in essence quasi-
parliamentary executive structures that but for the Incompatibil-
ity Clause of Article I, Section 6 would long ago have wrested 
the Cabinet Departments away from presidential control.29 
These quasi-parliamentary executive committee structures have 
very stable memberships that change little over time and that 
provide some of the stability that might otherwise be lacking be-
cause of the rapid turnover in presidentially appointed Cabinet 
Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries. To pick just one example, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee has essentially been dominated 
for the last 25 years by only four men: Senators Edward M. Ken-
nedy, Orrin Hatch, Joseph Biden, and Strom Thurmond. These 
four men have outlasted six Attorneys General and perhaps sev-
eral hundred junior level Justice Department employees. No ac-
count of the stability of the personnel involved in U.S. Justice 
Department policy would be complete without accounting for 
the influence of Senators Kennedy, Hatch, Biden, and Thur-
mond. Indeed, a case could be made that these four men have 
each been more important to that policy than were any one of 
the six Attorneys General who have held office in the last quar-
ter century. 
The United States makes up for its lack of ministerial stabil-
ity in presidential appointees with an astonishing degree of sta-
bility in its oversight congressional committee personnel and 
with great stability in the top ranks of the bureaucracy as well. 
Stability of executive structures is thus a strong point of the U.S. 
system and provides a solid reason for preferring U.S. style pre-
sidentialism to the revolving door Cabinets of Italy or Japan or 
Israel before 1996. 
3. Democratic Legitimacy: the Prime Minister 
A third and related advantage of U.S.-style presidential 
government over German-style constrained parliamentary gov-
ernment is that under the U.S. system the Chief Executive Offi-
cer is picked indirectly by the people in an open election rather 
29. This complicated argument and relationship is developed at greater length in 
Steven G. Calabrcsi and Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers 
or Separation of Personnel?, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1045 (1994). 
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than being picked by legislative political elites in a back room.30 
This is a great advantage of presidential systems since there is a 
significant loss of democratic legitimacy when important party 
leaders and potential Chancellors like Helmut Kohl and 
Gerhard Schroeder are picked by legislative elites behind closed 
doors. The selection of a nation's Chief Executive is one of the 
most important decisions any democracy has to make. To have 
the two or three leading candidates for such a post be picked by 
party leaders, instead of in open primaries, inevitably lessens 
popular control of the government. For many readers this ad-
vantage of presidentialism over parliamentarianism may be dis-
positive just by itself. The people of a country ou9ht to be able 
to pick directly their most important public official. 1 
Defenders of parliamentary government might note that the 
people do get a final choice in a parliamentary regime when they 
chose between the leading party-chosen candidates. This is true 
but the selection of who those candidates ought to be and there-
fore the range of the final choice available to the voters is not 
democratically made in a parliamentary system. American vot-
ers know well the advantages of our system of primary elections 
for selecting presidential candidates. American primaries win-
now the field and frequently tell us a great deal about the char-
acter, the beliefs, and the flaws in our presidential candidates. 
Even candidates who are favored by party leaders like George 
W. Bush and Al Gore are forced to build a popular base if they 
are to succeed in getting a party's presidential nomination.32 
30. Lijphart, Parlimentary Versus Presidential Government at 12-14 (cited in note 
21) ("The second major advantage of presidential government is that its popular election 
of the chief executive can be regarded as more democratic than the indirect 'election'-
formal or informal-of the executive in parliamentary systems."). 
31. Of course in the U.S. the choice is technically indirect because of the existence 
of the Electoral College but in reality the choice is direct since for over 100 years prior to 
the 2000 election and for most of our history before that the popular vote winner and the 
Electoral College vote winner have been the same person. 
32. The proposition that primary voters are better at selecting leaders than are 
members of the legislature can actually be empirically tested by comparing the post-1960 
presidential and vice presidential candidates in the United States. The former were se-
lected in significant part by electorates of primary voters while the latter were selected by 
the ultimate elite figure in each party-the presidential nominee. The vice presidential 
nominees in this period include seven strong candidates: Hubert Humphrey, Walter 
Mondale, George H.W. Bush, Lloyd Bentsen, AI Gore, Dick Cheney, and Joseph Lie-
berman-two of whom were picked in the current electoral cycle. The six weak vice 
presidential nominees during this period include William Miller, Spiro Agnew, Robert 
Dole, Geraldine Ferraro, Dan Quayle, and Jack Kemp. (Dan Quayle, for whom I briefly 
worked and whom I admire, was unfairly but indelibly classified as being a weak candi-
date). Seven strong vice presidential candidates and six weak ones suggests something 
approaching a 50% failure rate when it comes to elite selection of vice presidents. In 
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This need for popular legitimation of presidential candi-
dates is a very good feature of the American system of selecting 
Chief Executives, which is lacking in parliamentary regimes. It 
should not be sufficient to win a national nomination for a leader 
to have the backing only of party insiders and not of the rank 
and file voters. Building a popular base, first in one's party, and 
then among the electorate at large, qualifies a candidate to gov-
ern. Candidates for Chief Executive ought to be forced to build 
such a popular base rather than being merely able to win among 
the party's more elite legislative members. 
Once nominated, candidates in a presidential system face 
the people in an election that they must win on their own and 
not by being carried into office by the popularity of their politi-
cal party or its issue positions. In some parliamentary regimes, 
like Italy's until recently, the nominee of the biggest party was 
bound to become prime minister even if he was not the best man 
for the job. Presidential candidates cannot coast on their parties' 
reputations, platforms, or credentials but must prove themselves 
to be the best Chief Executive on the merits. This, too, is an ad-
vantage of presidential systems. 
There is no reason to believe that legislators are better than 
the people themselves at picking chief executive officers. The 
talents that make someone a good legislator or policy-maker are 
not necessarily ones that would carry over into being a good 
judge of government personnel. Legislators may pick Prime 
Ministers not because an individual is the best for the job but in 
order to facilitate the passage of some bill that is important to 
their state and district. Tying together the job of the legislator 
contrast, the presidential candidates during this period, selected in part by primary vot-
ers, were much stronger. Strong candidates in my opinion included nine individuals: 
Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, Walter Mondale, 
Michael Dukakis, George H.W. Bush, AI Gore, and George W. Bush. Two more, Rich-
ard Nixon and Bill Clinton could be ranked as brilliant but warped. Weak candidates 
included four individuals: Barry Goldwater, George McGovern, Jimmy Carter, and 
Robert Dole, and even they were not without their strengths. 
By my evaluation, at least nine out of fifteen presidential candidates selected by 
presidential primary electorates during the last thirty-six years were strong candidates 
who were well qualified to hold the top office. In contrast, only fifty percent of the vice 
presidential candidates picked through an elite process during the same period of time 
were comparably strong. I submit this record provides empirical support for the intuition 
that democratic selection of a nation's top officials through a process of primary elections 
is valuable, if not indispensable. It is, of course, possible that elites would do a better job 
of picking the top candidate on a two person ticket than they have done at picking the 
number two candidate, but this seems unlikely to me and, in any event, could not explam 
all of what I perceive as being a large gap in the quality of presidential as opposed to vice 
presidential candidates. 
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and the job of selecting the chief executive is thus a bad idea. It 
guarantees that the localist, pork barrel perspective of a Repre-
sentative will play some role in picking a person whose function 
is to be chief executive of the nation. This is a serious mistake. 
Relatedly, there is a noticeable difference between the 
kinds of politicians who become Prime Ministers in parliamen-
tary systems and the kinds of politicians who become presidents 
in presidential systems. Prime Ministers, especially in multi-
party regimes like Italy and Japan tend to be colorless, machine 
politicians who are bland compromise figures acceptable to all 
the party bosses because they will not rock any boats. They of-
ten lack the charisma and the ability to speak on television to the 
nation that presidents have, and they are unlikely to inspire 
young people the way a John F. Kennedy or a Ronald Reagan 
could. The typical legislative leader is a figure like former 
House Speakers Carl Albert or Tip O'Neill or current House 
Speaker Dennis Hastert. These individuals may make great log-
rollers, but they are not the kind of people to lead a nation into a 
war, either on poverty or against Iraq. Young people in Italy 
and Japan faced with Prime Ministers like Carl Albert and Denis 
Hastert are bound to become disenchanted with or at least unin-
terested in democracy. This has in fact occurred historically, as 
colorless, machine politicians picked by elites have hurt the de-
mocratic cause in France before 1958, in Italy, in Japan, in Israel, 
and in India. 
Direct election by the people is essential today for legiti-
macy and even the strongest parliamentary regimes like Ger-
many and Spain have suffered because they have lacked leaders 
picked directly by the people. Germany, for example, was gov-
erned for years by the uncharismatic Helmut Kohl, an individual 
who is in many ways typical of the logrolling leader who tends to 
get picked when legislators select the Chief Executive. Kohl, 
like virtually all the recent Prime Ministers of Italy and of Japan, 
was a compromise figure whose main talent was in assembling a 
party caucus majority by appeasing different party factions 
rather than in appealing to voters. Like many of his recent Ital-
ian and Japanese counterparts, Kohl was an uninspiring figure 
who was a typical career politician and log-roller. Even as he 
presided over major historic events like the reunification of 
Germany and the expansion of the European Union, Kohl was 
viewed as a stolid and stable figure but not a great inspirational 
leader. He ultimately, like many of the logrolling Prime Minis-
ters of Italy and Japan, was enmeshed in scandal, although in 
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Kohl's case not until after he had left office. Helmut Kohl was 
by far the longest serving and most successful of the non-British 
Prime Ministers of recent years, and yet even he showed signs of 
the leadership flaws that typified Prime Ministers in Italy, Japan, 
and other weaker parliamentary democracies. 
To be sure, there have been exceptions to the general rule 
described above. Prime Ministers Felipe Gonzales of Spain and 
Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain are certainly charismatic 
figures with a genuine popular following in their home countries. 
Great Britain, however, is unlike most constrained parliamen-
tary democracies in that it does not require proportional repre-
sentation and so has a vigorous two party system. This two party 
system in turn produces strong Prime Ministers who are not be-
holden to minor party members of a legislative coalition. Spain 
under Felipe Gonzales was a newly emerged democracy that still 
elicited great public support from those who remembered and 
feared a return of Franco-style fascism. It remains to be seen 
whether Gonzales' successors will be as charismatic and will 
generate as much public support as he unquestionably did. 
My point here is not that all parliamentary leaders are un-
charismatic, stolid logrolling figures like Tip O'Neil but merely 
that parliamentary leaders tend to be like that compared with 
Presidents. It is a bad and dangerous thing for a democracy to 
be always personified by figures that lack charismatic appeal, be-
cause the foes of democracy often attack it for putting compro-
mise and logrolling ahead of principle. In fact, it is a great 
strength of democracy that it usually puts compromise and log-
rolling ahead of principle because this is a reason democracy 
leads to stability and prevents violence. But, it may be desirable 
for a democracy to showcase leaders who have a little more 
popular appeal rather than showcasing the leaders who do the 
compromising. Presidential government does this by putting 
charismatic leaders in the presidency and compromise leaders in 
less visible but quite vital positions in the legislature. This pro-
tects democracy by giving it charismatic leaders who can fulfill 
the public's longing for that type of leadership, thus foreclosing 
the emergence of fascistic or communistic leaders who can cam-
paign as charismatic alternatives to compromising democratic 
politicians. 
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4. Democratic Legitimacy: the Cabinet and the Bureaucracy 
A fourth advantage of American-style presidential govern-
ment over German-style constrained parliamentary government 
is that it leads to enhanced democratic control of the Cabinet 
and of the bureaucracy. Just as popular control of the Prime 
Minister or CEO is important to democratic legitimacy, so too is 
popular control of these other lesser but critically important ex-
ecutive offices. Several features of parliamentary government 
cause reduced popular control over the Cabinet and the bu-
reaucracy in my opinion. 
Beginning with the Cabinet, it is important to note a point 
emphasized by political scientist Arend Lijphart who argues that 
one of the three key distinctions between presidential and par-
liamentary regimes is whether they have a unitary leader, as 
presidential systems have, or a collegial executive, as parliamen-
tary systems have.33 Lijphart argues that presidential executive 
structures are hierarchical, with the president firmly in charge, 
whereas Prime Ministerial executive structures are colleflial with 
the Prime Minister usually only the first among equals.3 I agree 
with Lijphart that this is a key distinction between presidential 
and parliamentary governments. In parliamentary governments, 
Prime Ministers often have to cede whole Cabinet Ministries and 
their policy portfolios to powerful factions in their ruling coali-
tion. For example, the powerful former German Prime Minister 
Helmut Kohl ceded the foreign ministry for many years to his 
Free Democratic Party coalition partners. In Italy and Japan, 
and in Israel until it temporarily adopted a form of presidential 
government in 1996, powerful ministries were routinely divvied 
up among the multiple party coalition partners who formed 
every government. The problem with this system is one that we 
American's have learned to call "Agency Capture", except that 
in these instances what is usually being captured is a whole 
Cabinet Ministry. Cabinet or Agency Capture occurs when the 
individuals who are most interested in the policy decision of a 
Ministry or Agency devote all their political capital to capturing 
that Ministry or Agency and turning it to their own purposes. 
The problem with Agency Capture is that it puts the foxes in 
charge of the chicken house, as it were. Those who are supposed 
to be regulated by an agency become instead the masters of it. 
33. Arend Lijphart, Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Ob-
servations, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 91, 93 (cited in note 3). 
34. Id. 
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Agency and Cabinet Capture are a genuine problem in the 
United States. Agencies like the Federal Trade Commission and 
Cabinet Departments, like the Commerce and Labor Depart-
ments, are all too often captured by those whom they are sup-
posed to regulate. A key check against Capture according to 
most scholars is America's unitary executive. The President, 
who is alone vested with all of the executive power35 and is 
elected by all of the people, can be lobbied to rein in special in-
terests in his electoral coalition. He can be urged to prevent 
special interest groups or ideologues from diverting public policy 
into immoderate or non-public-interested directions. And, any 
President who fails to do this may be punished (or see his heir 
apparent punished) in the next electoral cycle. Voters in the 
United States expect a President to fight against special interest 
capture and they will reward or punish him for the caliber of his 
Cabinet appointments. 
In a parliamentary democracy, on the other hand, Cabinet 
or Agency Capture is foreordained to be a major problem. Min-
istries are typically given out to leading figures in parties who are 
vital members of the coalition, and key ministries often go to 
leading factions within even one party. Whereas in the United 
States only the less important agencies and Departments are 
given away, in parliamentary democracies it is not uncommon 
for vital ministries like Foreign Affairs and the Treasury and the 
Interior Ministry to be handed out as key plums to factional or 
minor party coalition leaders. A Prime Minister may not only 
emerge as a first among equals, he may have little power at all to 
check what his coalition partners do in their own Cabinet fief-
dams. Since the Prime Minister may have to depend on his coa-
lition partners for support in the event of a no confidence vote, 
he may well find himself in a very weak bargaining position 
overall. Fringe parties like Jorg Haider's in Austria or the small 
religious parties in Israel may capture vital Cabinet Ministries 
that particularly interest them, and they may divert national pol-
icy in their domains away from moderate left or right of center 
positions to suit their own partisan ends. 
In the United States, we must constantly wrestle with the 
problem of Agency or Cabinet Capture and the President is al-
ways our most reliable backstop against it because of his elec-
toral incentives toward moderation. In a parliamentary regime, 
35. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 138-39 (1926); Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654,697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the Prime Minister's incentives are very different from those 
faced by our Presidents. Instead of worrying about moderate 
swing voters, Prime Ministers have to worry about appeasing 
fringe parties and factions which are able to bring down their 
government. The result is that policy gets made to appease 
fringe groups instead of centrists and so Cabinet Capture is a key 
part of the dynamic in parliamentary regimes. 
This phenomenon feeds into the general dissatisfaction that 
the public may experience with parliamentary government in 
weak, multi-party systems. The public dislikes the power that 
fringe groups like Haider's or the Israeli religious parties wield 
in very fragmented multiparty regimes. Having extreme parties 
wield great power over key Cabinet Ministries like Foreign Af-
fairs or Treasury or Interior is frightening and disillusioning at 
the same time. It causes centrist voters to lose faith in democ-
racy and opens the door for populist appeals by anti-democratic 
forces in the military and elsewhere who condemn the bickering 
and bartering of party leaders always out to divide the spoils of 
high government office. Presidential Government helps avoid 
Cabinet and Agency Capture because the President is empow-
ered hierarchically to rein in his coalition partners and to assert 
the preferences of the moderate swing voter. Parliamentary 
Government on the other hand institutionalizes Cabinet and 
Agency Capture, because it is by this mechanism that legislative 
majority coalitions get put together. 
When one looks below the Cabinet level at other posts in 
the bureaucracy much the same dynamic can be seen. In a 
presidential system like ours, subordinate executive positions get 
filled with about 4,000 or so supporters of the President and his 
agenda who get appointed to the so-called exempt or schedule C 
political spots that constitute the Clinton Administration or 
Reagan Administration. A great feature of our system is that 
every four to eight years the whole upper range of the executive 
branch is reinvented from scratch as new presidents bring in tal-
ented outsiders from business, academia, and law firms to fill the 
4,000 or so positions that constitute the new administration. This 
infusion of fresh blood helps maintain civilian control over the 
bureaucracy by exposing the life-tenured non-policymaking bu-
reaucrats to a regular stream of "in-and-outers"-political ap-
pointees who serve in government for a few years and then re-
turn to the private sector.36 It is good for life-tenured 
36. For more discussion, sec Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court 
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bureaucrats to be exposed to and supervised by civilians in this 
way, even though they often do not much like it. Popular con-
trol of the government would be less meaningful if it did not 
reach down into the depths of the bureaucracy where many pol-
icy decisions in fact get made. 
Professor Ackerman criticizes the American system for its 
lack of professionalism, and he suggests the more careerist bu-
reaucracies in many parliamentary regimes are more likely to 
follow Rule of Law values and to implement policies consistently 
over time.37 Ackerman especially dislikes the tug of war that of-
ten goes on between presidential political appointees and con-
gressional committee staffs for the allegiance of the professional 
bureaucrats who must sometimes take direction from both the 
President's appointees and the legislative leaders of an opposi-
tion political party in Congress.38 
Ackerman is probably right that there is some loss of consis-
tency and Rule of Law values inherent in the American system,39 
but he overlooks an enormous gain in democratic legitimacy that 
is accomplished by forcing career bureaucrats to always engage 
in dialogue with presidential appointees and congressional 
committee staffs. This constant exposure of professional deci-
sion-makers to civilian superiors is democratizing in exactly the 
same way as the system of trial by jury is democratizing. There 
is probably some cost in terms of the Rule of Law (as there 
surely is with jury trials) but the desirability of decentralization 
and the threat of tyranny outweighs that for me (as it does also 
with trial by jury). There is great value in intermingling profes-
sional and civilian decision-makers as each can learn from expo-
sure to the other. The American system does this in a very 
clever fashion, which should not be underestimated even if it has 
yet to be romanticized in the way jury trial has been. 
Moreover, there are other benefits to the American system 
that are analogous to those that flow from the jury system as 
well. It is often mentioned that an advantage of trial by jury is 
that it educates the citizenry in the American system of govern-
and the Constitution: A Brief Positive Account of the Role of Government Lawyers in the 
Development of Constitutional Law, 61 Law & Contemporary Problems 61 (Winter, 
1998); see also Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, "Tenured" Lawyers, 61 Law & Contem-
porary Problems 83 (Spring, 1998) (making the case for less reliance on presidentially 
appointed "in-and-outers" and more reliance on civil service protected personnel). 
37. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 690-92,712-14 (cited in note 2). 
38. !d. 
39. !d. 
2001] VIRTUES OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 75 
ment and imparts to them important values that make democ-
racy work better. The same I submit is true of our system of se-
lecting congressional and junior Administration staffers to hold 
key political positions in an Administration. It is democratizing 
to control the bureaucracy through several thousand junior level 
Administration and congressional staffers because those staffers 
become better educated as to how our system of government 
really works. Raising such junior level staffers up to positions of 
power and then regularly cutting them down again when an 
Administration ends is democratizing of the whole social order. 
It creates a large cadre of former executive and junior level con-
gressional staffers who can be drawn on by future Administra-
tions and who feel a special loyalty to the departments and insti-
tutions of the U.S. government. Citizens who are former jurors 
make better citizens and citizens with Capital Hill or Admini-
stration experience will be better citizens. 
5. Two Party Systems and Presidential Government 
A fifth advantage of U.S.-style presidential government 
over German-style parliamentary government is that presiden-
tialism leads to two party systems and two party systems are sta-
ble and democracy-enhancing. Both of these points require 
elaboration, and I will start with the last point first. 
The advantage of a two party system is that it tends to result 
in a high degree of moderation in a political system. When there 
are only two political parties competing with each other both 
parties tend to compete for and focus their attention on the cen-
trist voter. The two parties are usually moderately left of center 
and moderately right of center and both resemble large coali-
tions with a variety of very different factional elements. In a re-
gime with a two party system, the factions must be brought to-
gether in one of the two coalitions before any voting takes place. 
The voters then get to choose between the two coalitions and the 
centrist voter is often most empowered. Both party coalitions 
have an incentive to submerge and/or tame their most extreme 
elements to win over centrist voters and extremists, understand-
ing this, will grudgingly comply. The whole system tends to re-
volve around the needs and preferences of the middle 20% of 
the electorate. The right-most 40% and the left-most 40% are 
de-emphasized except to the extent that they agree with one an-
other. Because coalitions are formed before any voting takes 
place both parties are constantly trying to put on a moderate im-
age aimed at appealing to the critical swing voter. The parties 
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thus have an incentive to keep their rhetoric and public images 
as reasonable as possible. 
In multi-party regimes on the other hand with proportional 
representation, the parties compete publicly and visibly for de-
finable niches on the political spectrum. There is an incentive to 
exploit racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences to try to 
win a place on the political spectrum. Once represented in the 
legislature, a party will bargain to secure the maximum amount 
of policy leverage for its position on the issues its members care 
most about. The politics of such a regime are far more frag-
mented than those of a two-party regime and coalitions tend to 
get put together after elections are held rather than before as in 
an American style two party system. 
The advantage of the two-party system is that it is much less 
likely to lead to democratic breakdown than is the multi-party 
system, and it is much more likely to lead to moderate politics 
and rhetoric in politics. For individuals who are cautious and 
who fear democratic breakdowns, which have historically led to 
warfare, ethnic cleansing, and violent persecution, the advan-
tages of a stable two-party system seem very clear. As the child 
and grandchild of World War II refugees, I personally cannot 
imagine gambling on a multi-party regime over a more moderate 
two-party regime if I had any choice in the matter. The costs of 
democratic breakdown are so high and the comparative benefits 
of a multi-party system so low that I cannot imagine the risk be-
ing worth taking. Change in democracies is best managed in-
crementally and moderate two party systems are well suited to 
make incremental changes. Cumulatively, those changes can be 
quite considerable as citizens of the U.S. learned during the New 
Deal or Great Society eras. There is simply no need for a multi-
party system in order to accomplish fundamental change in a 
democracy. Those changes will happen anyway under a two 
party system if they have majority support. 
Assuming that a two party system is desirable, as I believe it 
is, what evidence can be adduced to suggest that presidentialism 
is likely to lead to the emergence of a two party system? To be-
gin with, the experience in France since 1958 tends to confirm 
that it is likely to lead to a two party system according to politi-
cal scientists Juan Linz,40 Arend Lijphart,41 Giovanni Sartori,42 
40. Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Differ-
ence?, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 3, 34, 51,80 n.47 (cited in note 3). Linz 
observes that "[s]everal authors have noted that most stable presidential democracies 
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Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach,43 and Ezra Suleiman.44 They all 
agree that France under the Fifth Republic has moved toward a 
more stable and moderate two party regime. France suffered 
from severely fragmented party politics under the Third and 
Fourth Republics, but since 1958 there has emerged what ap-
pears to be a pattern of two alternating centrist coalitions-one 
on the right and the other on the left-both of which have suc-
cessfully and responsibly controlled either the presidency or the 
parliament and both of which have cohabited with the other. 
This sudden move from one of the world's most fractious and 
unstable party systems to one that looks to me to be more func-
tional than any outside of the U.S. or the U.K. is striking. Pro-
fessor Suleiman describes the transition as follows: 
The institution of the presidency and the election of the 
president by popular vote have formed alliances within the 
Left and within the Right. Conquering the highest office has 
stimulated a restructuring of the parties-at least of the par-
ties who wished to share power- because without alliances 
obtaining a majority is extremely difficult. The presidential 
system has bipolarized elections, so that the system is one that 
has "two principal poles, each composed of several separate 
parties forced to cooperate with each other in order to win the 
presidential election and to govern with a parliamentary ma-
jority which reflects that cooperation. "45 
approach the two-party system according to the Laakso-Taagepera index, while many 
stable parliamentary systems are multiparty systems." Id. at 34 (footnote omitted). 
41. Arend Lijphart, Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Ob-
servations, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 91, 98 (cited in note 3) ("[T]he 
pressures toward a two-party system exerted by presidentialism are also likely to make 
the left-right dimension dominant and to squeeze out all other issue dimensions"). 
42. Giovanni Sartori, Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism, in 1 The Failure 
of Presidential Democracy 106, 115 (cited in note 3) ("It should furthermore be acknowl-
edged that in the French formula the direct election of the president has played an im-
portant and positive role in that it has 'presidentialized' the party system, forcing it into a 
bipolar mold. This is not a fortuitous outcome. Since the presidential office is a nondi-
visible win, presidentialism counters 'proportional politics."') (footnote omitted). 
43. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Com-
parative Perspective, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 119,212 (cited in note 3) 
(Of thirty-four parliamentary democracies they studied, "eleven had between three and 
seven effective political parties. Both of the semipresidential democracies in this uni-
verse had between three and four effective political parties. However, no pure presiden-
tial democracy had more than 2.6 effective political parties. These data indicate that con-
solidated parliamentary and semipresidential democracies can be associated with a large 
number of parties in their legislatures, whereas consolidated presidential democracies are 
not .... ") (footnote omitted). 
44. Ezra N. Suleiman, Presidentialism and Political Stability in France, in 1 The 
Failure of Presidential Democracy 137, 138, 140, 147 (cited in note 3). 
45. Id. at 147. 
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Professor Suleiman goes on to say that "[t]he bipolar tendency 
of the party system since 1962 has considerably reduced the 
weight of the center and extremist parties [and has] engendered 
a similar restructuring on the Left and the Right. "46 He con-
cludes that a "fleeting familiarity with American presidentialism 
would have indicated to the drafters of the 1958 constitutional 
text that the American two-party sj'stem is a derivative of the 
presidential form of government."4 It is indeed the case that 
America's two party system did not exist in the 1780s before we 
had presidential government and it emerged in the 1790s almost 
immediately after the incentive system created by the existence 
of the presidency had been put in place. 
Presidentialism has given France a two-party system, as it 
did the U.S., and I think this is a wonderful development that 
protects against democratic breakdown. I seriously doubt 
whether the Left and Right are as well equipped to alternate in 
power in countries like Japan, Italy or even Germany as they are 
in France, where are a pro-regime coalition of the "ins" (the 
Court Party) is always arrayed against an anti-regime coalition 
of the "outs" (the Country Party). Forcing the extreme right or 
left to submerge itself in and be tamed by one of two centrist 
parties is important to preventing a re-emergence of the political 
dynamics of the 1920's and 1930's, as Professor Linz's own work 
once persuaded me when I was his student. Two-party systems 
help save democracy, and presidentialism tends to produce two 
party systems. That being said, Professor Ackerman is plainly 
right that it is a disastrous error to combine presidential democ-
racy with proportional representation for the legislature, since a 
fragmented legislature could invite a presidential coup and pro-
portional representation tends to lead to fragmentation. 48 
6. Presidentialism is Anti-Ideological 
A sixth advantage of presidential government over con-
strained parliamentary regimes is that the former tends to be 
anti-ideological while the latter tends to be highly ideological. I 
see this as an advantage for the same reason as I see two-party 
systems as an advantage. Non-ideological regimes are less likely 
to break down as a result of violence or of racial, linguistic, eth-
nic, or religious tensions. Given the huge costs of democratic 
46. Id. (footnote omitted). 
47. Id. 
48. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 656 (cited in note 2). 
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breakdown in loss of human rights and of life itself, this feature 
of presidentialism inclines me to strongly favor presidential 
separation-of-powers-regimes. 
Let us begin consideration of the non-ideological nature of 
presidentialism with the point with which we ended the last sec-
tion: presidentialism is inconsistent with the use of proportional 
representation in legislative elections. I agree with Professor 
Ackerman that this is the case. The reason is quite simply be-
cause proportional representation leads to multi-party systems 
and it would weaken and fragment the legislative leadership.49 
Consider how such a system might play out if it were imple-
mented in the U.S. 
At the end of his term in office, President Clinton con-
fronted at least five very strong legislative leaders: Tom DeLay, 
Dick Armey, Dick Gephardt, Trent Lott, and Tom Daschle. 
These five men powerfully limited the actions President Clinton 
could take and restrained the power of his presidency. Now 
imagine that we had proportional representation in the House of 
Representatives. Instead of facing a powerful Republican and 
Democratic Party leader, President Clinton might have faced a 
House with a leader from: the Christian Coalition, the Libertar-
ian Party, an African-American Party, the Social-Democratic 
Party, the Business Roundtable Party, the Ku Klux Klan Party, 
the Green Party, and the Labor Party. Such a fragmented party 
leadership would carry little leverage with President Clinton and 
so the presidency would have become incomparably more pow-
erful. This is the dynamic that in fact plays out now in many 
Latin American countries that combine presidentialism with 
proportional representation, and it is a dynamic that has con-
tributed to democratic breakdown through presidentially-led 
coups in some of those countries. Presidents must be confronted 
by muscular legislative leadership and that means presidential-
ism is incompatible with proportional representation. Professor 
Ackerman is right to emphasize this point50 and to note that it 
casts doubt on efforts like Lani Guinier's to move the U.S. to-
49. For discussion of the hazards of combining proportional representation and 
presidentialism, see Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, Presidentialism and Parliamenta-
rism in Comparative Perspective, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 119, 131 
(cited in note 3); Carlos Santiago Nino, Hyperpresidentialism and Constitutional Reform 
in Argentina, in Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New 
Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America 161, 167 (Westview Press, 1996). 
50. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 656 (cited in note 2). 
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ward proportional representation without changin~ from a 
presidential to a parliamentary system of government. 
The incompatibility of presidentialism with proportional 
representation and its tendency to encourage a moderate two-
party system of politics means that presidential government is 
anti-ideological-a point that Professor Ackerman makes but 
which he sees as a disadvantage of presidentialism and not an 
advantage.52 Professor Ackerman's interest in democratic dia-
logue and his optimism about government law making causes 
him to be considerably less risk averse than I am. I remain more 
concerned about the danger of fascistic and communistic break-
downs in democracy over the course of the last century with at-
tendant threats to human life and liberty. 
Presidential government is anti-ideological in two other im-
portant ways, in addition to its being incompatible with propor-
tional representation. First, as Ackerman notes, presidentialism 
tends to encoura~e a politics of personality particularly at the 
presidential level. 3 Presidential elections are often personality 
contests to a considerable degree. Voters weigh non-ideological 
factors like George W. Bush's likeability against AI Gore's na-
tional policy experience and make their decisions for decidedly 
non-ideological reasons. This happens to some extent in parlia-
mentary regimes but much less so than in presidential systems of 
government where the personal characteristics of the President 
become tremendously important once he is elected to office. 
The personalities of incumbent presidents also matter 
greatly in presidential systems of government. President Clin-
ton's personal foibles occupied a great deal of the time and en-
ergy of America's political elites, as Professor Ackerman points 
out,54 and in the 1980's President Reagan's forgetfulness and in-
attentiveness with respect to Iran-Contra was also the object of 
massive elite attention. Professor Ackerman decries this enor-
mous out-pouring of energy devoted to personality rather than 
the issues, but I applaud it. In a democracy the people should 
pay great attention to watching those who govern them and it is 
healthy to have people discuss issues other than the very divisive 
issues of religion, class, and race or ethnicity that divide all de-
mocratic polities. The politics of personality gives voters a 
51. I d. at 657 n.53. 
52. ld. at 657-64. 
53. ld. at 657-64. 
54. ld. at 659. 
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source of entertainment and something to talk about that brings 
the country together instead of emphasizing the ways in which 
people disagree or differ. This is very healthy in a democracy, 
and it tends to reduce the likelihood of class warfare or religious 
or ethnic strife. Everyone can have an opinion on President 
Clinton's or President Reagan's personal foibles and those opin-
ions will cut across the lines of division that might otherwise di-
vide the polity, which is all to the good. The politics of personal-
ity, which accompanies presidential systems, is thus a good thing, 
which deserves our praise, and not a flaw as Professor Ackerman 
argues. 
This raises, in turn, a second more general point about the 
way in which presidential systems are non-ideological which 
grows out of their arbitrary carving-up of time and space into ar-
bitrary electoral units. We have already discussed how U.S.-
style presidential systems reject proportional representation in 
favor of single member geographic legislative districts in a way 
that is non-ideological and even anti-ideological. The basic point 
is that the fundamental unit of democratic representation is a 
geographic entity and not an ideological point on the political 
spectrum, so geographic districting tends to cut across ideology 
and to de-emphasize it. U.S.-style presidential regimes thus use 
geography or space to make ideology matter less. They produce 
a blander, more moderate, and safer brand of politics. 
U.S.-style presidential systems also use arbitrary divisions of 
time to do much the same thing. The timing of elections in the 
U.S. constitutional system strike the advocates of parliamentary 
government as pointless and arbitrary because elections occur 
every two, four, or six years without any regard for what is hap-
pening at that time in the political world. Advocates of parlia-
mentary government like Juan Linz find this bizarre and prefer 
that elections be called when there is something important to de-
cide, as usually happens in countries with parliamentary re-
gimes.55 Linz finds it odd that our rigid time schedules for hold-
ing presidential elections might keep in office a Jimmy Carter, 
who has lost public favor, while forcing re-election bids on a 
Franklin Roosevelt, who is wildly popular. He decries this arbi-
trary division of electoral time in U.S.-style presidential regimes 
as senseless, and thinks it prevents the people from making deci-
55. Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Differ-
ence?, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 3, 9-10 (cited in note 3). 
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sions through elections when it is important that those decisions 
be made. 
I disagree with Linz that the U.S. system is senseless and 
much prefer the arbitrary division of time into two, four, and six 
year increments over letting powerful elites decide themselves 
when to hold elections, as occurs in parliamentary regimes. The 
arbitrary timing of elections in presidential democracies, like the 
arbitrary drawing of geographical district lines, tends to blur 
over and de-emphasize ideological fault lines in the body politic. 
This is a good thing because latent social conflicts, be they ideo-
logical, religious, ethnic, or class-based, are often potentially ex-
plosive. It is desirable to have arbitrary lines of geographic dis-
tricting or election timing that may cut across the latent but 
potentially explosive social cleavages that all democracies must 
contain. Presidentialism does this, in my judgment, while par-
liamentarianism is less likely to. 
The point is well illustrated by a brief reference to the poli-
tics of Switzerland, a so-called consociational democracy which 
Arend Lijphart ably studied and described earlier in his career.56 
Switzerland is an intriguing puzzle for political scientists because 
its politics works so smoothly notwithstanding its division into 
three language groups: German speakers, French speakers, and 
Italian speakers. Why does Swiss democracy work so well with 
such ethnic and linguistic division when other multi-lingual, 
multi-ethnic democracies like Canada's have experienced such 
strife? The answer, according to Lijphart, is, in part, that the 
Swiss cleavages of language and ethnicity are cross-cut by other 
cleavages like religion and the urban-rural split.57 Put more con-
cretely, half of all Swiss Germans and French are catholic and 
half are protestant. And, half of all Swiss Germans and French 
live in primarily urban Cantons while half live in primarily rural 
ones. The linguistic ethnic cleavage in Switzerland is thus cross 
cut by the religious and urban-rural cleavage, which means that 
the same groups of people are not always confronting each other 
across the same lines of division. In Canada, in contrast, the 
English speakers are predominantly protestant and the French 
speakers are predominantly catholic, so cleavages of religion re-
56. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration 71-
81, 119-29 (Yale U. Press,1977). See also Arend Lijphart, 2 The Politics of Accommoda-
tion: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (U. of California Press, 1968); Arend 
Lijphart, ed., Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: Dynamics of a Culturally Divided So-
ciety (Institute of International Studies, 1981). . . 
57. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies at 71-81, 119-29 (c1ted m note 56). 
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inforce cleavages of ethnicity and language instead of cutting 
across them. This helps explain why the Quebecois in Canada 
feel like a disadvantaged minority while French speakers in 
Switzerland do not. Citizens of Quebec literally may have less in 
common with citizens of Ontario than do German and French 
speaking Swiss citizens. Swiss democracy works because social 
cleavages cross cut, and Canadian democracy works less well be-
cause social cleavages are reinforcing. 
The relevance of this to arbitrary timing and geography for 
election rules is that arbitrarily drawn election lines and dates for 
holding elections can artificially create cross-cutting cleavages 
that will make democracies work better. In the United States, 
for example, we have major regional divisions among the North-
east, the South, the West, and the Middle West that are greatly 
de-emphasized by the arbitrary division of the country into 50 
States and 435 congressional districts. The arbitrary drawing of 
these geographical State and district lines has helped blur over 
differences and makes U.S. citizens less aware of them.58 Simi-
larly, arbitrary timing for the holding of elections also de-
emphasizes social cleavages of race and class in the U.S. Elec-
tions are not held in the wake of riots or depressions or reces-
sions, at the calling of political elites, but are rather held on an 
arbitrary schedule every two, four, or six years. The end result is 
that U.S.-style presidentialism has constructed arbitrary cross-
cutting lines of geography and timing which perform some of the 
beneficial functions that naturally cross-cutting cleavages per-
form in Switzerland. Such cross-cutting cleavages are vital to the 
emergence of stable multi-ethnic democracies because they 
guarantee that all citizens have at least some things in common 
with one another. It is a great benefit of U.S.-style presidential-
ism that it can produce anti-ideological politics and cross-cutting 
cleavages of the kind that are necessary to guarantee stable de-
mocracy. 
This leads me to another point of disagreement with Profes-
sor Ackerman concerning his claim that presidentialism pro-
duces odd lurchings of policy because it creates a chance, when 
one party controls all the levers of power, to entrench decisions 
and policies in war.s that may prove very hard for ordinary ma-
jorities to reverse. 9 The basic assumption is that Democrats or 
58. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In 
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752,765-69 (1995). 
59. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 650-53 (cited in note 2). 
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Republicans in the U.S. wait for a moment when their party 
dominates the White House and the Congress and then they 
rush in and pass a whole lot of laws that they merely dreamt of 
during the preceding 20 years of divided government. Under 
this model the supply of certain kinds of legislation is radically 
different depending on whether one party controls the White 
House and the Congress or whether there is divided control. 
When there is one-party control Professor Ackerman predicts 
sweeping legislation, when there is divided control he implicitly 
predicts some degree of gridlock and less important legislation 
being passed. 
Professor Ackerman's model is to some extent contradicted 
by the facts. Consider the brilliant work of his Yale colleague, 
Professor David Mayhew, who argues in Divided We Govern 
that the supply of legislation is not affected by whether one party 
controls all the levers of power or whether there is divided gov-
ernment.60 Mayhew studies all major legislation passed in the 
post World War II era between 1946 and 1990 and finds essen-
tially no difference between periods of one party control and pe-
riods of divided control in the pace of lawmaking. 61 He notes 
that major bills like the Taft-Hartley Act, the Marshall Plan of 
1948, the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the Clean Air Act of 1970, the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, the War Powers 
Act of 1973, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 all passed during 
periods of divided party control of the White House and the 
Congress.62 Professor Mayhew does note that major bills are 
slightly more likely to pass in the first two years of a presidential 
term than in the last two years,63 and he does identify periods of 
ideological surge, including one that ran from roughly 1964 to 
1974 and that favored expansion of government.64 But, Profes-
sor Mayhew sees no correlation whatsoever between the passage 
of major legislation or even the holding of important oversight 
hearings and the existence of one party or divided government. 
The fact is that Congress produces legislation, and it conducts 
oversight investigations, according to its own incentives and 
needs and not with reference to which party is sitting in the 
60. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party, Control, Lawmaking, and Inves-
tigations, 1946-1990 (Yale U. Press, 1992). Professor Ackerman cites Professor 
Mayhew's work, see Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 645 n.l8 (cited in note 2), but seems 
not to take as much comfort from it as I do. 
61. I d. at 175-99. 
62. !d. at 51-99. 
63. !d. at 118. 
64. !d. at 142-45. 
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White House. If the public wants legislation and investigations 
the Congress produces them. If the public wants a quiescent 
Congress that is what the public gets. It is simply not the case 
that political elites sit around Washington, DC and say: "Now we 
have one party control of Congress and the White House. 
Good. Let's entrench some laws." The supply of legislation is 
independent of whether or not there is one party control of the 
White House and the Congress or not. In this respect, too, the 
American system of government is fundamentally non-
ideological. American political elites do not try to entrench laws 
in the self-conscious fashion that Professor Ackerman suggests. 
7. Presidentialism Leads to Judicial Review 
A seventh advantage of presidential separation of powers 
systems of government over parliamentary systems is that the 
former are potentially more compatible with the existence of a 
strong system of judicial review. This is because a Constitutional 
Court that faces a divided Executive-Legislative policy-making 
apparatus may often be able to enlist either one or the other to 
support its controversial rulings. A Court facing a fused parlia-
mentary government on the other hand may in some circum-
stances be intimidated into behaving more cautiously. It is strik-
ing in this regard that the emergence of presidential government 
in France after 1958 coincided with and led to the creation of a 
system of judicial review in that country which had traditionally 
been hostile to judicial review. And, just as separation of powers 
horizontally led to judicial review in France, separation of pow-
ers vertically-a.k.a. Federalism-helped give rise to judicial re-
view in the United States and Australia. Playing the Umpire be-
tween the President and the Assembly, as in France, or between 
the Nation and the States, as in the U.S., strengthens constitu-
tional courts. 
In a recent book comparing the legal systems of the United 
States and the United Kingdom, Chief Judge Richard Posner 
openly speculates that perhaps the U.S. system's separation of 
powers has given our courts more political freedom to be active 
and make policy than the British courts had faced, as they are by 
a unified parliamentary government.65 Chief Judge Posner's 
point is very logical and is well taken. A court system that can 
navigate between Congress and the President and between the 
65. Richard A. Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America 33-35 
(Clarendon Press, 1996). 
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Nation and the States will have more political latitude than will a 
court system that confronts a unified and fused Executive-
Legislative policy making apparatus. At a bare minimum, a 
Court system in a separation of powers regime is less likely to 
see its interpretations of statutes displaced by the re-passing of 
the statute in revised or re-written form. This is the case because 
it is harder for Congress and the President to agree on how to 
overturn a judicial construction of a statute than it would be for 
a parliamentary majority to do that. The separation of powers 
and federalism strengthens Constitutional Courts and gives them 
an important umpiring role to play. Court watchers in the 
United States have observed this phenomenon first-hand in re-
cent years as the U.S. Supreme Court has greatly accelerated its 
review of laws on structural constitutional grounds. That in-
creased review has augmented the national judicial power and 
has led to more invalidations of Acts of Congress per Term than 
has been seen in many years in the U.S. 
Professor Ackerman might reply at this point by noting that 
the constrained parliamentary democracy of Germany has a very 
powerful Constitutional Court that has not been impaired at all 
by the existence of a fused Executive-Legislative majority, which 
it must confront. This is clearly true, and the German exception 
obviously means that judicial review can flourish in a parliamen-
tary setting.66 Nonetheless, notwithstanding Germany, it is 
probably the case, that all other things being equal, separation of 
powers and federalism are helpful in facilitating the growth of 
judicial review in a setting where it previously did not exist for 
the reasons set out above. It is perhaps worth noting in this re-
gard that Germany is a Federation and that the Federalist Upper 
House of its legislature plays an important role in selecting Con-
stitutional Court judges. Moreover, that Court, once seated, de-
votes half its personnel-one of two senates67 -to the task of po-
licing separation of powers and federalism boundary lines in the 
German Basic Law (or Constitution). I certainly would not 
claim that parliamentary government is incompatible with judi-
cial review, but I do think the existence of a constitutional sepa-
66. See Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 668-70 (cited in note 2) (discussing the im-
portance of separation of powers for judicial review). 
67. The German Constitutional Court has sixteen members who sit in two senates 
or chambers or eight members each. One senate hears predominantly structural consti-
tutional cases and the other mostly individual rights cases. For a brief history and de-
scription, see David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 1-32 
(U. of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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ration of powers or of federalism is helpful to getting judicial re-
view established. Once established as an Umpire among juris-
dictions a Constitutional Court may later turn its attention to po-
licing Bills of Rights much as happened in the U.S. during the 
course of the last 100 years. 
8. Presidentialism, Bicameralism, and Federalism 
The eighth advantage presidential government has over par-
liamentary government is that the former is more comrsatible 
with bicameralism and a federal system than is the latter. 8 Pro-
fessor Ackerman in a fine discussion demonstrates, I think con-
clusively, that once a country has two fully co-equal Houses in a 
legislature it absolutely must have a separately elected President 
rather than a Prime Minister selected by one of the two 
Houses.69 The reason for this is evident as a matter of common 
sense. The two Houses of a legislature cannot be truly co-equal 
if one gets to elect the Cabinet and the Prime Minister and the 
other does not. Nor is it possible for both of two Houses of a bi-
cameral legislature to elect the government. One would need a 
tie-breaking rule, and it is difficult to imagine what that rule 
would be. For this reason, every parliamentary regime with a bi-
cameral legislature has always embraced a system where the 
lower House, which elects the government, is quite a bit more 
powerful than is the Upper House. Professor Ackerman calls 
this the one and one-half House solution/0 and he praises it at 
some length. 
I have major reservations about the one and one-half House 
solution on its own merits, at least for countries where federal-
ism is an important part of the constitutional fabric as it is in the 
United States. In a true federalist regime, it is important that 
laws be supported both by a majority of the people and by a ma-
jority of the people in the States or Provinces. Otherwise na-
tional majorities might be tempted to enact laws that are wildly 
unpopular in some regions of the federation, with seriously de-
stabilizing results. The U.S. bicameral solution of two fully co-
equal Houses protects against such sectional law making much 
68. Linz notes that "[I]t is sometimes argued that presidentialism is particularly ap-
propriate for federal republics because the president can serve as a unifying symbol, es-
pecially in the absence of a monarchy, and can represent the nation as a totality in a way 
a parliament cannot." Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It 
Make a Difference?, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 3, 42 (cited in note 3). 
69. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 671-83 (cited in note 2). 
70. Id. at 635,636,671-87. 
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better than does a one and one-half House solution, and I thus 
t~ink it is worthy of emulation by newly emergent federalist re-
gimes. 
This point is important, as Professor Ackerman implicitly 
acknowledges, because federalist regimes are likely to be very 
much in vogue as the nations of the earth continue to become 
more interdependent and need to cooperate more without losing 
their identities. Federal and Confederal structures like the 
European Union, NATO, NAFfA, the WTO, and GATT are all 
probably harbingers of new and more powerful global coalitions 
to come.71 If federalism represents the wave of the future, as I 
believe, and if federalism requires bicameralism, then we have a 
powerful additional argument for presidential government since 
only presidential government can work with two fully co-equal 
houses in the national legislature. The key question is, does fed-
eralism really require two fully co-equal Houses or can the one 
and one-half House solution be made to work? Let us consider 
this critical issue a bit more closely. 
To begin with, we might ask what assurances powerful na-
tion States are likely to seek before surrendering power to a fu-
ture global federation. Consider here say the cases of Britain 
surrendering power to the European Union or the U.S. surren-
dering power to a NAFfA-like North American confederation. 
Both of these cases presently strain credibility almost to the 
breaking-point because it is inconceivable that Britain and the 
U.S. would surrender sovereignty to those entities today. But, 
let us consider them anyway just as hypotheticals. It seems to 
me that it would be highly likely that at a minimum the U.S. and 
Britain in this situation would demand that there be one fully co-
equal body in the legislature where nation states were equally 
represented and had a chance to veto majoritarian but anti-
federalist initiatives and laws. That is what happened historically 
in the United States with the Great Compromise that led to the 
creation of our bi-cameral Congress, and it is consistent with 
what happened in the Swiss federation where the two chambers 
are fully co-equal. 
Professor Ackerman responds by pointing to the Canadian 
and Indian Federations as parliamentary democracies, which 
have followed the one and one-half House solution,72 but these 
71. For additional discussion, see Calabresi, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 756-73 (cited in 
note 58). 
72. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 672 (cited in note 2). 
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countries are hardly models of federalist harmony in part be-
cause regional interests in both Canada and India feel terribly 
insecure. Canada, of course, faces a very serious separatist chal-
lenge in Quebec because the citizens of that French Speaking 
Roman Catholic Province do not feel assured that their interests 
will be adequately protected by the Canadian Parliament. And, 
in India, separatist movements have engaged in violence and 
even assassination because of their dissatisfaction with the safe-
guards they are afforded under Indian constitutional law. It 
would be excessive to claim that fully co-equal bicameralism 
would alone solve the Canadian and Indian separatist problems, 
but it seems to me equally excessive to hold out Canada and In-
dia as paragons of federalistic harmony and good feeling! Surely 
the U.S. and Switzerland come closer to the mark in succeeding 
as federations with their two co-equal houses, Great Compro-
mise solution. 
Professor Ackerman wisely notes that American federalists 
pay a price for having the Senate which is that they have to ac-
cept with it the great nationalizing institution of the Presidency. 
On this point Ackerman is squarely right. Having a Senate fully 
co-equal to the House does mean Americans had to accept 
presidential government, and in doing that they certainly bought 
into a very nationalizing institution. The U.S. Presidency is 
clearly one of the great nationalizing forces in the American 
constitutional order. 
But having a nationalizing presidency opposite a federalistic 
Senate is a good thing, both in the U.S. and as a matter of ab-
stract constitutional design. It means that both the national ma-
jority and a majority of the people in a majority of the States 
find a voice to represent them in Washington, D.C., which is 
highly desirable. The U.S. presidency thus goes hand in hand 
with the Senate in a very positive way. Even as the Senate in-
duced the States to come into the Union and surrender some of 
their sovereignty, the Presidency began making us all think of 
ourselves as Americans first and citizens of our respective states 
second. Presidential elections produce Presidents and the thou-
sands of "Officers of the United States" whom they bring into 
office with them who think of themselves as Americans first. In 
this way our Presidential systems has truly helped us become one 
nation. 
Imagine the effect if the European Union could tomorrow 
elect a President who would appoint 4000 "Officers of the Euro-
pean Union" for a four year term. Federalism in the EU would 
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be greatly advanced by such a structure. Is this too high a price 
for a federalist to pay to get the veto that comes with co-equality 
of the two Houses of the legislature. No. Not at all. Where fed-
eralism is desirable and even inevitable it is a good thing to have 
the people cement their new political identity by voting together 
en masse for the top office. It helps build those mystic bonds of 
union that forge new nations and bring peoples permanently to-
gether who once were enemies. 
To sum up, it is my strong instinct that: 1) federalism repre-
sents the wave of the future; 2) that federalism will only succeed 
if there are fully co-equal bicameral legislatures instituted in the 
new federations; and that 3) this bicameralism will lead to and 
will require the adoption of a presidential separation of powers 
system of government. 
9. Presidentialism and the War Power 
A ninth advantage of presidential systems of government 
over parliamentary systems is that presidential systems may be 
better at fighting and winning wars than are parliamentary sys-
tems. In a time of war, democracies need and benefit from the 
stability that presidential systems can offer. The United States, 
for example, has produced some very formidable wartime lead-
ers including: George Washington, Andrew Jackson, Abraham 
Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roo-
sevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kenndy, 
Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and George Herbert Walker 
Bush. Every one of the twelve above listed men-one-quarter 
of all the men who have held the high office-was either a mili-
tary hero himself or led the nation in a dramatic way in time of 
war. That is quite a record for building leadership, and it helps 
explain why the U.S. is today the world's only remaining super-
power. American presidents over two hundred years have been 
able to rally the public and the Congress, assert control over the 
military, and win.73 This is no mean accomplishment for a 
democracy, since democracies tend to be peace-loving regimes 
that err on the side of weakness rather than fortitude in in-
ternational relations. 
73. Linz notes that "[o]ne argument used sometimes in favor of presidentialism is 
that it provides the political system with a personalized leadership that the armed forces 
can identify with as their supreme commander; it would be more difficult to identify with 
a prime minister." Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make 
a Difference?, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 3, 45 (cited in note 3). 
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Professor Ackerman makes much of the point that the U.S. 
as a victor in World War II encouraged its defeated opponents, 
Germany, Japan, and Italy, to adopt parliamentary regimes.74 
Yet he never stops to ask if that was a disinterested preference 
on our part? Of course if was not. We did not want Germany, 
Japan, and Italy to have strong executive structures because we 
did not want them to be able to engage in future warfare. We 
knowingly pushed them toward constitutional structures that 
have kept them weak in the sphere of military and foreign policy 
matters because we did not fully trust them after 1945. One of 
those weakening structures was parliamentary government, 
which generates less stable executives and cabinets than does 
presidential government. 
Professor Ackerman might respond by pointing to the great 
British War Cabinets led by men and women like Winston Chur-
chill, Lloyd George, and Margaret Thatcher, but Britain is an 
atypically stable parliamentary regime. Britain differs from al-
most all other parliamentary regimes in that it effectively has a 
two party system, and so it produces stable governments led en-
tirely by either the Tory or the Labour Party's parliamentary 
leader. In most parliamentary regimes, France under the Third 
and Fourth republic75 or Japan or Germany today, the govern-
ment in power represents a coalition of parties. Such coalition 
governments are bound to be more fragile than are presidential 
cabinets. It is interesting to note in this regard that the British 
had to suspend holding elections during World War II whereas 
we Americans have never had to do that. Even during the brutal 
Civil War and during World War II, we honored our quadren-
nial cycle and sent voters to the polls even as our troops were 
deployed in battle.76 
The most recent parliamentary democracy to make the 
switch to presidentialism is Israel,77 which is interesting given the 
unusual military and foreign policy problems that nation faces. 
It seems likely that the greater stability of presidentialism would 
74. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 634-36 (cited in note 2). 
75. It is perhaps striking that the French Third Republic fell to Nazi invaders, while 
the Fourth Republic fell to the Algerian crisis. Ezra N. Suleiman, Presidentialism and 
Political Stability in France, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 137, 142 (cited in 
note 3). 
76. I owe this point to Akhil Amar who rightly argues that President Lincoln's will-
ingness to hold elections in 1864 deserves the same respect as is accorded President John 
Adams' willingness to cede power to Jefferson after Adams lost the election of 1800. 
Conversation with Akhil Amar, November 1999. 
77. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy at 123-24 (cited in note 5). 
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prove desirable to a country like Israel beset with serious foreign 
policy problems. Obviously, presidentialism is not necessary for 
a democracy to have a potent military force, but I think it is, all 
else being equal, quite helpful. Presidential democracies have a 
capacity in time of war to go into a mode of what might be called 
Executive "Full Authority" to borrow a useful term from Ac-
kerman,78 and they then typically revert back to a mode of lesser 
authority in peacetime. This flexibility and adaptability in con-
stitutional arrangements is a valuable feature of presidential sys-
tems of government, which is thus able to tailor the degree and 
extent of executive power to somewhat fit the situation. Obvi-
ously, wartime prime ministers, like Churchill, with a solid ma-
jority in parliament can sometimes prove very successful but on 
balance the stability of presidentialism seems likely to give it a 
distinct advantage in time of war. 
One way of posing the question is to ask ourselves what ex-
ecutive system we would prefer if we could design a Constitution 
for a future hypothetical European Union or NAFT A Constitu-
tion. I personally would want the advantage of presidential 
leadership in time of war for any democracy that I was a citizen 
of, so long as the legislature had the war declaring power. How-
ever, if I were designing the Constitution of Germany or Japan 
or some democracy, which I was not a citizen of, the parliamen-
tary form would surely look better. Presidents are dangerous to 
a countries' enemies as America's adversaries have had occasion 
to learn. No parliamentary democracy other than Britain has yet 
been a major military and diplomatic player on the World stage, 
whereas the United States has time and again proved itself to be 
the Arsenal of the Democracies. Future democratic federations 
should think long and hard before giving up the capacity for 
presidential leadership in time of war that now exists in the 
United States. It has proved itself quite valuable over the last 
200 years. 
10. Preserving Liberty; Entrenching the Status Quo 
The tenth and final advantage of presidential systems of 
government, which I wish to discuss is their greater capacity to 
preserve liberty and the status quo as compared to parliamen-
78. Ackerman powerfully describes what he calls the American systems mode of 
Full Authority when one party controls the presidency and both Houses of Congress. 
Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 648 (cited in note 2). 
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tary systems.79 As one who is more skeptical of (though not en-
tirely hostile to) government intervention in the economy, I 
count it as a big benefit of presidential systems that they make 
government actions and interventions more difficult to under-
take. The stability and entrenchment of legal rules that presi-
dentialism helps create is an enormous boon to individual and 
corporate economic actors because it greatly facilitates long-
range economic planning. Separation of powers systems are 
simply much less likely to fall for hare-brained regulatory 
schemes than are parliamentary systems. I think it is no acci-
dent, thus, that the parliamentary democracy of Great Britain 
nationalized and privatized more industries than did the United 
States during the same periods of time. Our constitutional struc-
tures led to that because it is simply easier to get a government-
supported Bill approved by a majority in the House of Commons 
than it is to get it approved by a majority of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the Senate, and signed by the President. 
My libertarian preference for inaction is, of course, ideo-
logical and may not be shared by many of my readers, but I 
should note that all forms of liberty-personalliberties as well as 
economic liberties- are preserved by the American structure of 
checks and balances. Bicameralism and presentment in the U.S. 
act as an obstacle to all efforts to change the law, whether those 
efforts come from the Christian Coalition or from the AFL-CIO. 
The U.S. has had an excellent civil rights record when one com-
pares it with other multi-racial and multi-ethnic democracies 
around the world, and our system of checks and balances is 
probably part of the reason. We have an onerous, consensus-
requiring law-making process that makes minorities feel secure 
and that protects civil liberties. Change under this system may at 
times be frustratingly slow, but that is better than having it be 
too fast. 
The U.S. system of checks and balances does lead, as Pro-
fessor Ackerman notes, to more entrenchment of legal rules un-
der the U.S. system than occurs in parliamentary systems.80 Put 
another way the status quo is more entrenched in the U.S. sys-
tem because an emerging electoral coalition has to win more 
elections to get its changes enacted than it would under a par-
liamentary regime. Some ordinary statutory laws in the U.S.-
79. For Ackerman's contrary position, see Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 722-23 
(cited in note 2). 
80. Id. at 650-53. 
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those enacted during the New Deal or the Great Society years 
for example-are effectively entrenched under the American 
system because an extraordinary or unusual majority would have 
to be elected to repeal them. 
Professor Ackerman implies that there is too much en-
trenchment under the U.S. system, but I submit the evidence of 
this is sorely lacking. Much of the entrenchment in the U.S. to-
day is the result of the public's distinct preference for Divided 
Government-for splitting control of the White House and con-
trol of the Congress between the two major political parties. 
Professor Morris Fiorina argues that Divided Government in the 
U.S. in substantial measure reflects the public's indecision about 
ideological matters, and its affirmative preference therefore for 
only small, incremental changes in the status quo. 81 If Fiorina is 
right, then much of what Ackerman describes as entrenchment 
reflects simply a public preference that Ackerman does not 
share. Ackerman would prefer-as would I-that there be one 
party control of the House of Representatives, the Senate and 
the White House (we disagree on which party), but the public 
prefers inaction, so Divided Government results. This en-
trenchment of the status quo is one both Ackerman and I dislike 
(for different reasons), but it is a democratic result democrati-
cally arrived at. It simply means change will happen more slowly 
in the U.S. than in parliamentary democracies because the status 
quo will always be a little more entrenched. 
The fact is that entrenchment, whether in a Constitution or 
in some hard-to-repeal statute, is empowering as well as restrict-
ing. Entrenchment creates, as constitutionalism creates, the op-
portunity for inter-generational lawmaking. One generation gets 
to bind another and in exchange is bound by its predecessors 
with the result that some things can be done that could not be 
done before. Without credible entrenchment of freedom of the 
press or protection of property rights, who would dare to write a 
book or build a factory that could become the basis for hostile 
government action in 20 years? Without credible entrenchment 
of statutes protecting the right to unionize or forbidding dis-
crimination, can we be sure that we would have had the levels of 
labor and racial peace that we have had? Entrenchment, like a 
contractual obligation, causes us to give up a short term freedom 
81. Morris Fiorina, 2 Divided Government (Allyn and Bacon, 1996). Professor Ac-
kerman cites Fiorina's work, see Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 645 n.l8 (cited in note 
2), but he docs not take the same degree of comfort in it that I do. 
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to breach in exchange for the power to bind ourselves and those 
we bargain with in mutually beneficial ways over the long term. 
Some forms of entrenchment can go too far (the Articles of Con-
federation), and Ackerman, unlike the Westminister crowd, is 
more than willing to accept some entrenchment as good. But 
what evidence is there that there is too much entrenchment in 
the U.S. system as it now works? The voters do not think so as 
evidenced by their deliberate and repeated reinforcing of the 
constitutional separation of powers through divided party gov-
ernment. 
The United States protects liberty and the status quo with 
more bulwarks to law-making than are imposed by any other G-
8 economic power, and yet the U,S. has a faster rate of economic 
growth, a larger per capita GNP, a lower unemployment rate, 
and a younger and faster-growing population than the great par-
liamentary democracies of the world-at the same time as it pays 
most of the military cost of keeping the democratic world free. 
Obviously, there are many causal factors behind America's eco-
nomic and social success, but I do think constitutional structure 
and culture is part of the explanation. Presidential separation-
of-powers systems protect liberty and encourage economic 
growth better than do parliamentary regimes. The partisans of 
liberty and growth should be partisans of presidentialism and of 
the separation of powers, as well. 
B. PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT At-;D DEMOCRATIC 
BREAKDOWN: THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
I tum now to rebutting Professor Ackerman's strongest ar-
gument against U.S.-style presidentialism, which is his suggestion 
that it has proved peculiarly liable to democratic breakdown 
when exported to under-developed countries. The damaging 
fact here is that every single Latin American presidential regime 
has suffered at least one democratic breakdown during the 
course of its history.82 
82. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 646 (cited in note 2). Giovanni Sartori ex-
plains, "On these criteria we come up, today, with some thirty presidential countries, 
mostly concentrated in Latin America. With the sole exception of the United States, all 
presidential systems have been intermittent .... Most ... Latin American countries (no-
tably Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile) reestablished presidential democracies only in 
the 1980's .... All in all, then, the record of the presidentially governed countries is-
aside from the United States-quite dismal and prompts us to wonder whether their po-
litical problem might not be presidentialism itself." Giovanni Sartori, Neither Presiden-
tialism nor Parliamentarism, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 106, 107 (cited in 
note 3) (footnote omitted). 
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To begin with, this disturbing record does not by itself es-
tablish that presidential government is more prone to break-
down than is parliamentary government. Political Scientists 
Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey reviewed the his-
tory of democratic breakdowns during the Twentieth Century 
and discovered that "there have been two waves of breakdowns 
of democracy in this century," one between World War I and 
World War II and the other in the 1960's. The first wave, they 
argue, "claimed mostly parliamentary regimes (and no true 
presidential regimes). The second claimed mostly, but not ex-
clusively, presidential systems."83 Among the pure parliamen-
tary regimes they count as having broken down are eight Euro-
pean regimes: Estonia (1934), Greece (1936), Greece (1967), 
Italy (1922), Latvia (1934), Lithuania (1926), Portugal (1926), 
and Spain (1936); and thirteen Third World cases: Burma (1962), 
Fiji (1988), Guyana (1978), Kenya (1969), Nigeria (1966), Paki-
stan (1954), Pakistan (1977), Sierra Leone (1967), Singapore 
(1972), Somalia (1969), Surinam (1982), Thailand (1976), and 
Turkey (1980). Mixed parliamentary-presidential regimes also 
broke down in six additional cases including: Austria (1933), Ec-
uador (1962), Germany (1933), Korea (1961), Peru (1968), and 
Sri Lanka (1982).84 
Cumulatively, Shugart and Carey conclude that presidential 
government is NOT more likely to break down than is parlia-
mentary government. "[W]e find no justification for the claim of 
Linz and others that presidentialism is inherently more prone to 
crises that lead to breakdown. "85 Even when considering only 
Third World cases of democratic breakdown Shugart and Carey 
"find that just over half (52.2%) of the presidential regimes in 
the less developed countries have broken down, while a higher 
percentage (59.1%) of the parliamentary regimes have."86 All 
but one of the twelve presidential breakdowns they identify oc-
curred before 1975, more than twenty-five years ago.87 And, as 
of August 2000, all of the four major Latin American economic 
powers: Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and, for the first time, Mexico, 
appear to be firmly embarked on a committed pro-democratic 
83. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Con-
stitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics 39 (Cambridge U. Press, 1992). 
84. I d. at 40. 
85. Id. at 42. 
86. Id at 41. 
87. Argentina (1930), Bolivia (1964), Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), Columbia (1953), 
Cuba (1954), Guatamala (1954), Korea (1972), Panama (1968), Philippines (1972), Uru-
guay (1973). The lone recent presidential breakdown was Nigeria (1983). Id. at 40. 
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course. Indeed, in the six years since Linz published The Failure 
of Presidential Democracy the four most powerful Latin Ameri-
can countries have done quite well, as have almost all of they 
newly emerged presidential democracies in Russia, Eastern 
Europe, and in South Korea and the Philippines. While many of 
these countries still have a long way to go, there is no evidence 
six years after Linz published his book that we are about to see a 
wave of democratic presidential breakdowns. 
The most important recent developments of interest to the 
fans of presidentialism are the decision of Israel to move to a 
unique constitutional system that Arend Lijphart classifies as be-
ing presidential,88 the rejection of parliamentary government in 
the Brazilian referendum on whether that country should switch 
governmental forms, and the open discussion in Italy of direct 
election there of the Prime Minister. These developments fit in 
with the fact that while no presidential regime has ever aban-
doned presidentialism to become a parliamentary democracy, 
several countries have followed France's example and moved in 
a presidentialist direction. There seems to be simply no question 
that most of the world does not see presidentialism as being an 
inherently risky governmental form, and for good reason. In the 
last 25 years, presidentialism has not been clearly and uniquely 
prone to new democratic breakdowns.89 
It is the case that several very poor Latin American coun-
tries, particularly Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela, as well as the 
very poor Eastern European country of Belarus, have experi-
enced severe political disruption recently, but there is no clear, 
overall trend away from democracy either in the presidential re-
gimes of Latin America or in the newly established presidential 
regimes in other parts of the world. One must note that it is only 
in the last 50 years, with U.S. troops stationed in much of the 
World that democracy has truly taken off around the globe. Be-
fore 1945 both Western Europe and Latin America faced a 
tough struggle in maintaining democracy outside of the United 
Kingdom and since 1945 Western Europe has gotten a lot more 
help in that respect than Latin America has from us. Accord-
ingly, it seems to me a little precipitous to draw from the Latin 
American data the conclusion that presidentialism outside the 
88. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy at 123-24 (cited in note 5). 
89. Several Latin American countries that did not experience new breakdowns 
within the last 25 years were nonetheless still recovering from older Cold War era break-
downs and were thus under authoritarian rule. 
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U.S. is bound to lead to Caudillos, just as it would be precipitous 
to conclude that parliamentary government outside the U.K. was 
bound to end as did the French Third or Fourth Republics. 
Plainly there is a danger to be guarded against that presidencies 
may deteriorate into tyrannies, and it is for this reason that it is 
important to always keep one's impeachment gun powder dry.90 
But it would be an over-reaction to conclude from the Latin 
American experience during the height of the Cold War91 that a 
regime type that serves the United States and France well is un-
suited today to Russia, Brazil, Israel, and Italy. 
It must also be noted, as Professor Ackerman observes, that 
there are critically important differences between U.S. presiden-
tialism, as it has been defended by me in this essay, and other 
forms of presidentialism that go by the same name. We cannot 
let the classificatory system of political scientists overwhelm 
these distinctions, just as Professor Ackerman wisely refuses to 
let the constrained parliamentarianism of Germany be lumped 
together with the quite different form of parliamentary govern-
ment of the British Westminster regime. 
The U.S. presidential system creates a much weaker presi-
dency than is created by many foreign Constitutions in at least 
five critically important ways. It is essential that we consider 
these five fundamental differences between U.S. style presiden-
tialism and other forms of presidentialism in order to highlight 
some unique factors that may be important to making our sys-
tem of presidential work. First, American presidents differ from 
elected presidents in France, Russia, and many other countries 
in that they have no formal constitutionally guaranteed power to 
engage in decree lawmaking92 or to invoke states of emergency.93 
90. It is perhaps somewhat ironic that Bruce Ackerman, one of the most public op-
ponents of presidential impeachment two years ago, should subsequently become con-
cerned that presidential government can deteriorate into tyranny! For Ackerman's rec-
onciliation of his impeachment testimony with his fears of presidential tyranny, see 
Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 659 (cited in note 2). 
91. The Cold War at times impaired the struggle for presidential democracy in 
Latin America because both Latin American elites and some U.S. policymakers unfortu-
nately let their fear of Communism push them into supporting some. rather hideo.us ant!-
democratic regimes. With the end of the Cold War ten years ago, this penod of history IS 
fortunately closed and the pressure for democracy in Latin America as well as elsewhere 
around the World is as strong as it ever has been which should in theory make future 
democratic breakdowns far less likely. 
92. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 647 (cited in note 2). The leading text on de-
cree lawmaking power classifies the U.S. presidency as having much less decree lawmak-
ing authority than do other presidential regi~es. John "':f· Carey and Matthew Sobe.rg 
Shugart, eds., Institutional Design and Executwe Decree, m Execullve Decree Authority 
274, 279 (Cambridge U. Press, 1998). The U.S. is ranked as havmg no constitutiOnally 
2001] VIRTUES OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 99 
While U.S. Presidents do issue many Executive Orders and have 
in Abraham Lincoln's case proclaimed a state of emergency, it 
would be a mistake to conflate the practice in the U.S. with that 
in other countries either in degree or in kind. Important law-
making truly is confined in the U.S. to the onerous process of bi-
cameralism and presentment, and this differentiates our presi-
dential system from others that go by the same name. This may 
be one feature of our system that should be advertised vigor-
ously overseas so that transplantation of presidentialism does 
not occur there through a process of bad translation. 
A second difference between U.S.-style and foreign presi-
dentialism is that American Presidents typically face very strong 
legislative leaders because of the senatorial requirement of ad-
vice and consent for all Cabinet appointments, which is unusual 
and makes our Senate uncommonly strong relative to the Presi-
dent,94 and because of the absence of proportional representa-
tion in our legislative elections. As we have already seen, pro-
portional representation weakens legislatures seriously and may 
render them too weak to successfully oppose the strong execu-
tives that presidentialism creates.95 American legislative leaders 
are also made strong by the very powerful system of congres-
sional committees and staffers which we have set up. Presidents 
in the United States and their Cabinets confront a virtual legisla-
tive government on Capitol Hill when they venture up to Con-
gress to testify before legislative Committees and Sub-
delegated decree law making authority and relatively little legislatively delegated decree 
lawmaking authority and most of that is in the area of foreign affairs. Brian R. Sala, In 
Search of the Administrative President: Presidential "Decree" Power and Policy Imple· 
mentation in the United States, in id. at 254. For valuable case studies of the arguably ex-
cessive usc of decree law making in Brazil and Argentina, two major Latin American 
democracies, see Timothy J. Power, The Pen is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential 
Decree Power in Brazil, in id. at 197 and Delia Ferreira Rubio and Matteo Goretti, When 
the President Governs Alone: The Decretazo in Argentina, 1989-93, in id. at 33. The coun-
try which Carey and Shugart find makes the most use of decree law-making is Russia, as 
is indicated in their comparative chart in Carey and Shugart, eds., Institutional Design 
and Executive Decree, in id. at 274, 279. 
93. Carlos Santiago Nino, Hyperpresidentialism and Constitutional Reform in Ar-
gentina, in Lijphart and Waisman, Institutional Design in New Democracies at 165 (cited 
in note 49). 
94. Linz points out that the United States' requirement of senatorial advice and 
consent for presidential nominations is "the exception rather than the rule" among presi-
dential regimes. Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a 
Difference?, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 3, 31 (cited in note 3). Linz ob-
serves that "[i]n the vast majority of presidential systems the president appoints his cabi-
net without congressional input, and the same is true for dismissal of cabinet members." 
Id. at 30 (footnote omitted). 
95. Sec text at notes 50-54 
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Committees, which fund and oversee their every action and must 
pass on all appointments not only to the Cabinet but to many 
sub-Cabinet positions as well. This powerful quasi-
parliamentary government of congressional committees and 
staffers undoubtedly keeps U.S. Presidents and their staffs on a 
much shorter leash than is common in other presidential democ-
racies. It may be noteworthy in this regard that the number of 
congressional staffers on Capital Hill greatly exceeds the 4000 or 
so staffers who work for the President as political appointees. 
We really have a quasi-parliamentary shadow government of 
congressional Committees, and this, too, may be a feature of 
American presidentialism which has not traveled well overseas, 
but which is of vital importance to maintaining a true balance of 
power between the President and the Congress.96 
Congressional staffs are empowered relative to the 4,000 or 
so presidential political appointees because the millions of fed-
eral employees who constitute the federal bureaucracy are pro-
tected by Civil Service laws, which, since the 1880s have pre-
vented the existence of a partisan spoils system in the United 
States. In some foreign countries with presidential systems, like 
France, presidential spoils systems are apparently a problem. 
This too is an important feature of American presidentialism, 
which must not be lost sight of.97 
A third feature of the American system, which differenti-
ates it from foreign presidential systems is that our Constitution 
makes no provision for national initiatives and referenda unlike 
many foreign Constitutions. This eliminates one tool that presi-
dents might use to move a country toward dictatorship and so 
again contributes to the stability of U.S. style presidentialism. 
96. Arend Lijphart explains the importance of the congressional committees by 
noting that: "presidentialism spells not only concentration of (especially executive) 
power but, by definition, also separation of power; if the separate legislative branch is 
effectively organized, particularly by a specialized and well-staffed committee structure, 
separation of power can mean an approximate balance of power between president and 
legislature and a presidency that is Jess than all-powerful. This reasoning applies well to 
the exceptional American case of presidentialism. Fred W. Riggs ... calls the committee 
structure of the U.S. Congress one of the 'para-constitutional practices' that accounts for 
the survival and success of presidential government in the United States .... " Arend 
Lijphart, Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations, in 1 The 
Failure of Presidential Democracy 91, 101 (cited in note 3). 
97. Ezra Suleiman notes that France, unlike the U.S. today, has a serious problem 
with an over-politicized presidential spoils system. Ezra N. Suleiman, Presidential and 
Political Stability in France, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 137, 152-53 (c1tcd 
in note 3). 
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Fourth, the U.S. Constitution limits the President to two 
four-year terms in office, a limit that has a substantial basis in 
tradition as well as in formal constitutional law. Many but not 
all foreign presidential regimes have also opted for such term 
limits,98 and this may be yet a fourth way of keeping presidents 
in check that some countries should consider adding to their 
Constitutions. Many foreign nations have six or seven year 
terms for their presidents instead of the shorter and more ap-
propriate term of four years that the U.S. Constitution specifies. 
This too is a difference, which could be important in preventing 
the breakdown of presidentialism into dictatorship. 
Moreover, the U.S. Constitution in addition to guaranteeing 
the President a four-year term also guarantees that Senators and 
Representatives shall themselves serve fixed terms in office. 
And, it tellingly denies to the President any power to dismiss 
Congress and call for early congressional elections. Astonish-
ingly, some foreign presidents, including the Presidents of 
France and of Russia, are empowered by their countries' consti-
tutions to dismiss the legislature and call for early elections. The 
denial of this power to the President of the United States is 
surely an additional feature of our constitutional tradition that 
protects against a degeneration into Ceasarism. 
Fifth, and lastly we have an electoral system that tends to 
guarantee divided party control of the Presidency and the Con-
gress with the congressional party usually getting majority power 
in the States. Presidential victories in 1980 and 1992, for exam-
ple were followed by midterm elections in 1982 and 1994 in 
which the party not holding the White House picked up major 
gains both in Congress and in the nation's state houses. It is 
striking in this regard that throughout the Reaganite 1980s, De-
mocrats controlled a majority of the nation's governships, while 
during the Clinton era of the 1990s, Republicans have mostly 
controlled a majority of the nation's governorships. 
This trend may be more than just an accidental one. A ma-
jority of the States, including virtually all of the most important 
States, now elect governors during the off year mid-term cycle. 
Going back to the Nineteenth Century, the party not controlling 
the White House almost always does well and gains seats in the 
mid-term elections. If this pattern carries over to gubernatorial 
elections, as I suspect it may, the U.S. system may be set up to 
98. Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 662 (cited in note 2). 
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guarantee opposite or divided party control of the presidency on 
the one hand and of a majority of the nation's governorships on 
the other. This development, if it proves to be permanent, 
would certainly make presidential coups very hard to contem-
plate in the U.S., since it would be hard to lead a coup against a 
majority of the other party's governors. This, then, may be a 
fifth feature of U.S.-style presidentialism, which renders it less 
prone to democratic breakdown than have been the presidential 
systems of other countries. 
In conclusion, I do not think the experience of democratic 
breakdown of presidential regimes in Latin America more than 
25 years ago suffices to condemn U.S.-style presidentialism to-
day. U.S.-style weak or consensus oriented presidentialism is at 
least as superior to full throated Latin American presidentialism 
as German style constrained parliamentary government is supe-
rior to British style Westminster parliamentary government. 
Americans need not be ashamed but should instead be proud of 
their unique constitutional heritage, and should feel free to tout 
its virtues to others, with due concern for varying national cir-
cumstances. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Democracy has spread all over the world in the last twenty 
years, and there are today more fully functioning democracies in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia than ever before in 
human history. This global triumph of the democracies is cause 
for great joy, but it has raised anew age-old questions of institu-
tional design and of comparative constitutional law. Newly 
emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, and re-emerging de-
mocracies elsewhere, need help and advice, and they have on 
many occasions received such help and advice from American 
law professors and lawyers.99 One question that inevitably arises 
is, should a newly emerged democracy hold direct elections for 
its chief executive leader or should that person be elected by the 
legislature? Bruce Ackerman has an answer to that question. 
His answer is wrong. 
99. "Especially since 1989, American jurists have become big boosters of the 
American Way at constitutional conventions everywhere. When they arrive at the scene, 
however, their intellectual preeminence is by no means assured. To the contrary, Amen· 
can jurists regularly encounter vigorous competition from French and German constitu-
tionalists, who also operate as cheerleaders for their native constitutional traditions." 
Ackerman, 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 636-37 (cited in note 2) (footnote omitted). 
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U.S.-style presidential government is better than the form of 
German-style constrained parliamentary government defended 
by Ackerman. It is more democratic, more stable, less ideologi-
cal, and more compatible with economic growth, federalism, and 
judicial review than is parliamentary government. It is critically 
important, however, that the presidential system conform to the 
U.S. model in a whole host of details, rather than deviating into 
what might be called the hyper-presidentialism of many Latin 
American democracies. 100 Both of these two points are of equal 
importance. The presidentialism that I have vigorously de-
fended is unfortunately not the kind that many foreign countries 
have adopted. I share Ackerman's concern that foreign presi-
dential systems may have borrowed so powerful a model of the 
presidency that they are in danger of backsliding into authori-
tarianism. I hope this Article will help point the way to avoid 
such backsliding by shedding light on the features of presiden-
tialism that can cause it to succeed or fail. We owe it to the citi-
zens of newly emerged democracies everywhere to share our 
learning on these matters, which has been acquired over two 
centuries of American experience. 
The virtues of the American presidential system are impor-
tant to us in another way, which is as a guidepost in assessing the 
Supreme Court's ever evolving separation-of-powers caselaw. I 
have previously argued in defense of Justice Scalia's lone dis-
sents in Morrison v. Olson101 and in Mistretta v. United States 102 
that his vision of the separation of powers is essential to prevent 
us from backsliding into a form of parliamentary government 
where congressional committees manipulating so-called "inde-
pendent" agencies become the norm in the United States instead 
of the exception. 103 I hope this Article helps shed light on what 
is at stake in that debate over whether or not our Constitution 
creates a unitary executive. The virtues of presidential separa-
tion-of-powers government must be continuously defended in 
the United States as well as explained to interested observers 
from overseas. 
100. Carlos Santiago Nino, Hyperpresidentialism and Constitutional Reform in Ar-
gentina, in Lijphart and Waisman, Institutional Design in New Democracies at 161 (cited 
in note 49). 
101. 487 U.S. 654,697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
102. 488 U.S. 361,413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
103. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
Ark. L. Rev. 23 (1995). 
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In making this defense of the virtues of presidential gov-
ernment I want to emphasize that although the advantages of 
presidentialism far outweigh the disadvantages for me in the ab-
stract, I am well aware that these regime choices are never made 
in the abstract. I willingly and happily concede that there may 
be many situations where picking or staying with a constrained 
German-style parliamentary regime is the wiser course. Con-
strained parliamentary government is a big improvement over 
the pure British Westminster model, at least so long as propor-
tional representation is totally eschewed. Similarly, U.S.-style 
presidential government is much better than are many other 
things that go by the name of presidentialism. There is much to 
be gained from thinking about and identifying the things that 
have made particular presidential or parliamentary governments 
succeed or fail. Bruce Ackerman and Juan Linz are surely right 
that structure matters a lot even if they are wrong in my opinion 
to prefer constrained parliamentary government to a presiden-
tialist separation-of-powers. 
